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The Melanesian Way

Political Style in Modern Melanesia

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Abstract [5]

Source: http://press-files.anu.edu.au/

This chapter seeks to identify some of the elements of political style in modern Melanesia and to relate them to broader aspects of the region’s political culture.

The author does this by examining the following: the scale of politics and the politics of scale; the diversities of culture and language; the ‘Bigman Model’, or the men of influence; the colonial experience; and politics, economics and bisnis.

While the chapter conveys only a little of the spirit of Melanesian political style and does nothing to distinguish differential styles, it does confirm a particular Melanesian political style which is rooted in Melanesian political culture.

In recent writing about contemporary politics in Melanesia one frequently comes across the term style. The suggestion seems to be that there is, if not a unique, at least a distinctive Melanesian style (or styles) of politics. Hegarty, for example, speaks of an ‘essentially accommodative political and governmental style’ in Papua New Guinea (1979c:110) and Quiros (1979) speaks similarly of a ‘conciliatory style of political leadership’ in that country. (Also see Standish 1978:29 and Herlihy 1982:575.) Melanesian political leaders themselves frequently talk about doing things ‘in the Melanesian Way’ (for example, see Lini 1980).

This paper seeks to identify some of the elements of political style in modern Melanesia and to relate them to broader aspects of the region’s political culture.

I begin by accepting that there is such a thing as political style; I will not, however, attempt to define the term, except to say that it has something to do with the way in which nations’ leaders (and by extension nations themselves) behave within a framework set by formal constitutions and realpolitik. The suggestion that one can distinguish a national or regional political style implies the existence of an identifiable political culture,[6] though it does not deny the importance of individual personality in political style. By way of crude illustration, from outside Melanesia: I think one might reasonably argue that, say, the Ayatollah Khomeini, Emperor Bokassa, Ferdinand Marcos, and Bob Hawke display a variety of political styles which reflects differences in the respective political cultures from which they have emerged, and which could not be easily transferred from one political culture to another, and that the spectacle of the United States presidential elections reflects a style of politics which varies from that of even such other predominantly Anglo-Saxon Western democracies as the United Kingdom and Australia.

The literature of political science has little to say about political style at an aggregative level, except perhaps in the field of international relations where several authors have referred to national styles as an important factor in determining patterns of international negotiations (for example, see Druckman 1977 and references cited therein; Spanier 1978: chapter 12). There is, on the other hand, a substantial literature on personality and politics (much of it contributed by psychologists), which has a lot to say about individual styles and has occasionally attempted to make the leap from the individual to the group or nation, mostly however in the context of ‘developed’ societies.[7] The anthropological literature on leadership in Melanesia is also of obvious relevance to the question of style in modern politics, but except for the work of Standish on Simbu politics (especially Standish 1983, 1992) and perhaps that of Finney (1973) on bigmen and bisnis – both of which are about Papua New Guinea highlands societies – there appears to have been little interest in the relationship between traditional and modern political styles.

In approaching the question of political style in modern Melanesia one possible method would be to compile a series of political biographies and attempt to generalise national characteristics from these. Entertaining though such an exercise might be, the prospect of deriving some stylistic equivalent of a ‘modal personality’ from profiles of political leaders as personally disparate as, say, Walter Lini, Iambakey Okuk, Marten Tabu, John Kasaipwalova, Jimmy Stevens and Ratu Mara seems sufficiently daunting to suggest an alternative approach (a reaction which recent personality-and-politics studies would seem to support).

By way of alternative, it might be argued that if there is a distinctive Melanesian style of politics (or if there are distinctive styles) one might expect to locate its essence in a specifically Melanesian political culture (or cultures). Constraints of time and space prevent me from attempting to draw a comprehensive picture of Melanesian political culture. Instead I will suggest that there is a number of respects in which the culture(s) and the recent political history of Melanesia are, if not unique, at least unusual. Some of these are examined briefly in the following paragraphs.

The scale of politics and the politics of scale

Ward (1982) has touched on the question of the relative smallness and isolation of Melanesian societies and the impact this has had on their politics. This relationship is examined in greater detail in Benedict (1967) and in May and Tupouniua (1980). To quote from the latter:

The relationships between individuals in a small scale society thus tend to be more intense and social transactions to be dominated by personal relationships reflecting, amongst other things, kinship, village ties and ascriptive status. At the same time, the members of a small scale society tend to be more dependent upon one another’s actions than do those of a larger society. Typically, political and economic relations are dominated by series of recipro-cal obligations (between equals and between patrons and clients) but it is common, also, for small-scale societies to employ social pressures to ensure individual conformity to the values and objectives of the group. It is often suggested that smallness of scale promotes social cohesion, however there is little evidence for this; indeed as Benedict (1967:49) rightly points out, “intense factionalism” is a common feature of small communities. [May and Tupouniua 1980:423]

Diversity and (a little bit) beyond

Melanesia’s diversity is legendary. Linguists have commented on the region’s extraordinary linguistic diversity – and have made the interesting suggestion (Laycock 1982:33-38) that this diversity is not a function of isolation but that language has been used deliberately as a means of differentiating one group from another. Prehistorians and anthropologists, while reminding us of the extent of traditional exchange networks, have described a situation in which social units were typically small and in which intergroup relations were limited both in physical range and content.[8] It may be that we are sometimes inclined to overemphasise the extent of isolationism in pre-contact Melanesia; nevertheless the fact remains that even compared with tribal Asia and Africa, pre-contact Melanesia was fragmented to an unusually high degree and that to a substantial extent this fragmentation has survived the colonial period.

Related to this is a provocative suggestion made by Barnes (1962/71:9):

A characteristic of highland cultures, and perhaps of Melanesia as a whole, is the high value placed on violence … In these circumstances we might expect to find a less developed system of alliances and ‘counterveiling’ forces, and less developed arrangements for maintaining peace, than we would have in a polity directed to peace and prosperity.

Bigmen and all that

A substantial body of recent writing on leadership and social stratification in Melanesia seeks to distinguish between a stereotype of the typical Melanesian traditional society as egalitarian and communalistic, with leadership determined by competition between men of influence (what Standish 1978 refers to as the ‘Bigman Model’), and the reality of socially hierarchical, status-conscious societies in which heredity frequently played an important part in the selection of leaders. Without wishing to detract from this recent emphasis on social stratification (except occasionally to query the source of the stereotype), I think it is important that we not lose sight of the essential elements of truth in the stereotype: namely, that relative to Polynesia and most parts of Africa (not to mention traditional societies in Europe and Asia) social stratification in Melanesian traditional societies was not particularly formalised and that traditional institutions such as sorcery and warfare, as well as social attitudes to wealth, were frequently used as a means of preventing forceful individuals or groups from rising too far above the common herd (cf. Moulik 1973:123-127).

The exception in this respect, it would seem, is Fiji. There, traditional societies appear to have been more formally stratified and the status ordering, having been consolidated by colonial rule, has so far proved enduring (see Nayacakalou 1975; Nation 1978).

Whatever the situation may have been, there is now a well entrenched (if not universally accepted) belief that egalitarianism and communalism prevailed in pre-contact Melanesia, and that these values are integral to ‘the Melanesian Way’:

… our peoples are communalistic and communalism is the basis for our traditional way of life. Our values therefore must be communalistic. [Gris 1975:137]

The colonial experience

With respect to the impact of colonial rule on Melanesia’s political culture, I offer four comments.

The first is the unremarkable observation that the impact of colonialism has itself been diverse. Not only have the colonial masta exhibited a variety of political styles reflecting their indigenous political cultures (see papers by Nelson, Firth, Hastings, Scarr and Latham in May and Nelson 1982, and Ward and Ballard 1976) but the timing of the colonial impact has been responsible for major differences in the attitudes of colonisers to colonised, and particular circumstances of physical environment and historical events (notably the Second World War) have affected the Melanesian societies in different ways. For example, Australian colonialism in the New Guinea highlands in the 1950s was a very different thing from German colonialism in coastal New Guinea at the end of the nineteenth century, partly because of differences in the political cultures of the two colonisers and partly because of differences in the circumstances of contact, but primarily because prevailing attitudes towards colonialism in the late nineteenth century were rather different from the attitudes prevailing in the mid twentieth century (except, perhaps, amongst French colons). Similarly, the impact of the French on New Caledonia might have been very different if that territory had had no nickel.

Second, beyond this diversity colonialism has had a universal impact in breaking down traditional isolationism, facilitating the movement of people, goods and ideas, and fostering a national consciousness within the (largely arbitrary) geographical boundaries of the colonial system. Further, the colonial powers sought to develop this wider consciousness within the framework of institutions and norms imported, for the most part, from outside. (Consider, for example, the comments of Waddell 1973 on the appropriateness of the Westminster model to Papua New Guinea.) At the two extremes of this generalisation: in Fiji the British administration actively sought to ‘preserve’ elements of the traditional polity; in Irian Jaya Indonesian policy has been overtly assimilationist and the Melanesian political culture has been suppressed by direct political action and by heavy immigration. As in other parts of the world, however, the attempt to modernise Melanesian societies and to create national polities in the colonialist’s image has been only partially successful. For one thing, like colonised people elsewhere, Melanesians have already shown a remarkable capacity for adapting modernity to tradition and tradition to modernity and for maintaining, side by side with occasional overlapping, the forms and institutions of traditional politics with those of the introduced system. For another, in Papua New Guinea, the Solomons and Vanuatu separatist and what elsewhere (May 1975, 1982) I have called ‘micronationalist’ movements have emerged to contest, actively or passively, the political boundaries of the modern states. [See chapter 3.]

Third, and more controversially, it might be argued that while colonialism is very seldom a pleasant experience for the colonised and although Melanesia suffered its share of forced labour, punitive expeditions and the rest, for most Melanesians the colonial impact, judged against the broad sweep of world history, was relatively benign (Irian Jaya being the notable exception). Without wishing to press the point too far – and recognising that in some respects this is a condemnation of Australian colonial rule: there have been few countries in which, as in Papua New Guinea, the indigenous government, elected on a nationalist platform, has sought to postpone the granting of independence. This observation and the implications of it have been elaborated by the African Mazrui (1970:56).

Until the recent interest in large scale mining enterprise, Australian indifference denied New Guineans even the advantage of a shared anti-colonial resentment. The British [in Africa], by being exploitative, were also involved in fostering cultural homogenisa-tion, some economic interaction, some constructions of institutions for conflict resolution, and above all the beginnings of national consciousness. By the sin of indifference, however, Australia has denied her dependency such an infrastructure for nationhood. And she has denied her own participation in modern imperialism its ultimate legitimation – the legitimation of having laid the foundations of modern statehood.

Finally, in three Melanesian territories a major impact of colonialism (and I include Irian Jaya as a colony) has been the importation of non-Melanesian people. In Fiji and New Caledonia Melanesians are now in a minority of the population; in Irian Jaya non-Melanesians probably account for around 10 per cent of the population (Pacific Islands Yearbook 1978:223), but they are concentrated in the administrative and commercial centres and the proportion is probably rising. Obviously this makes for a different style of national politics.

Politics, economics and bisnis

In 1971 R. Kent Wilson wrote:

When the economic history of Papua New Guinea comes to be written by an indigenous scholar, it is possible that it will be seen in part as the search for a key, a search indulged in by both indigene and expatriate, by both tribes and Administration. Exotic religion, roads, schools, co-operatives, savings societies, information services, business advice and so on, have all been interpreted in some contexts by one or both parties to the dual economy as the key to economic advancement. When frustration or imagination took over, the search was diverted to cargoism, a cult which in broad terms has not been the preserve of the indigene. [Wilson 1971:525]

Nine years later the record of Melanesian business enterprises is little better than it was when Wilson carried out his survey of village industries (Wilson and Garnaut 1968). Equally remarkable is the general failure of the numerous locally-based devel-opment movements which emerged in Papua New Guinea in the early 1970s. And although various explanations have been offered (e.g. Nadkarni 1970; Wilson 1971; Andrews 1975; also see Jackman 1977) the questions which plagued business development officers and development bank officials in the 1960s remain largely unanswered. Yet individual and group businesses are still seen – perhaps increasingly – as a road to development and to the acquisition of social and political status, and in Papua New Guinea provincial governments are in the process of setting up business arms, already with some unfortunate results.

Peter Lawrence (1982) has suggested a distinction, in traditional societies, between ‘secular or empirical knowledge’ and ‘sacred or “true” knowledge’ and referred to the continued strength – in the face of education and material advancement – of magico-religious thinking as an obstacle to people’s understanding of the operation of the modern world. Certainly what Lawrence would refer to as cargoistic thinking, and what might be more generally described as inadequate understanding and unrealistic expectations about business, provides part of an explanation for the failure, in Western terms, of some business ventures; but it is also clear that Melanesians have not always seen the demise of businesses (or, indeed, their raison d’être) in the same terms as outsiders (just as Papua New Guinean lawyer, philosopher and consultant to his country’s Constitutional Planning Committee, Bernard Narokobi opposed the constitutional provision for an auditor-general on the grounds that such an office was unMelanesian).

The relationship between politics and bisnis in modern Melanesia is a complex one, especially as in Papua New Guinea, where a government leadership code seeks to restrict the business activities of national leaders, many of whom argue (with Iambakey Okuk) that the accumulation of wealth is an essential element of political status.

At the national level, also, there is in much of Melanesia an element of unreality in the ideological commitment of self-suf-ficiency and the fact that Melanesia is, per capita, probably the most heavily aid-assisted region of the world. Commenting on this in 1970 (from the viewpoint of a political party organiser) Michael Somare (1970:490) said: ‘our people are so accustomed to getting things for nothing … that they do not see why they should organise as political groups to express these demands.’

What sort of a picture does this leave us with and what sort of political style is suggested by these aspects of political culture?

The first generalisation I would offer – which follows on from the comments about scale and about fragmentation – is that politics in modern Melanesia, even at the national level, is essentially personal and group politics. In the absence of basic social divisions cutting across the Melanesian polities (to the obvious frustration of some Marxist analysts) the bases for political support in Melanesia are typically local or personal. With the exception of Fiji, and the qualified exception of New Caledonia (where French colonial attitudes and policies have produced the sort of anti-colonial nationalist solidarity whose absence in Papua New Guinea was noted by Mazrui), the Melanesian political culture has not proved to be a fertile ground for the growth of political parties. Even in Papua New Guinea, where in the early 1970s there appeared to be a well established incipient party system, political parties have not developed as the proponents of the Westminster model assumed they would; indeed in late 1980 the Pangu Pati machinery in both Morobe and East Sepik – probably the strongest examples of political party development in Melanesia outside Fiji – appeared to be in a state of total disarray. In provincial elections in Papua New Guinea during 1979-80 several provinces (including the East Sepik and Western Highlands) decided that they ‘would not have’ political parties because parties were ‘disruptive’. Moreover where incipient party structures have emerged they have tended to display a pronounced regional bias. Even within the West Papuan liberation movement, personal and regional/ethnic divisions have cut across the common cause of Irianese against Indonesian rule.

In the absence of Western-style parties political loyalties have tended to revolve around clan, local or ethnic divisions. This appears to have two major implications. On the one hand it makes for parochial, pork-barrel politics; on the other it ensures the interplay of traditional and modern politics, with the implications this has for the accumulation and distribution of wealth and influence for political purposes, the manipulation of kastom to political ends, and occasionally the use of violence (cf. Standish 1983). A corollary of this is the growing incidence of nepotism (in Papua New Guinea, wantokism; in Vanuata, ‘family government’). As several people (Melanesian and non Melanesian) have argued, there are strengths in a wantok system, but when the impact of wantokism is to entrench the position of those who for historical or other reasons have gained an initial advantage in the political-administrative system, wantokism has a great potential for exacerbating ethnic and regional tensions (cf. McKillop and Standish in May 1982).

A second observation, which derives from the comments about the fragmentation of traditional society, relates again to the importance of regionalism. Apart from the tendency for regionalism to manifest itself as a basis of political organisation within national politics, Melanesian societies have shown a marked propensity towards decentralisation, separatism and micro-nationalist withdrawal. Aside from such separatist tendencies as evidenced by the North Solomons, Papua Besena, Nagriamel and the Western Islands Movement in the Solomons, the formal decentralisation of political power which has taken place in Papua New Guinea and has been mooted in the Solomons is highly unusual in the experience of new states.

A third generalisation concerns the inconsistency between the ideology of ‘the Melanesian Way’, with its emphasis on equality, communalism, self-sufficiency and consensus, and its respect for tradition,[9]and the reality of political and social change in Melanesia which so often is characterised by social stratification, individualism, dependence and conflict (Standish 1980 uses the term ‘jugular politics’), and is so frequently anxious to embrace modern, capitalist development. In part, perhaps, this is evidence of a variety of Melanesian political cultures. In part it is a reflection of the gap between political myth and political reality which exists in all political systems. But it also has something to do with the use of ideologies rooted in a model of harmonious small societies to justify participation in a system imposed during colonial rule. And of course it should be said that ‘the Melanesian Way’ is not entirely myth. Melanesian politics often does reveal a concern for egalitarianism, a capacity for compromise, and (except perhaps for Fiji) a lack of respect for authority which places it apart from new states in Asia, Africa or America.

In a similar way the emphasis given to kastom or kalsa in Melanesia is in part evidence of genuine respect for tradition, but it is also a symbol manipulated by politicians (especially young politicians) to legitimate their participation in the modern system and as such, as Tonkinson (1980) has pointed out, can be used both as a force for national unity and a force for ethnic division.

I am aware that this paper does little to capture the spirit of Melanesian political style. And it does nothing to distinguish differential (for example, highlands as opposed to coastal) Melanesian styles. But I hope it does suggest that one might be able to talk about a Melanesian political style, rooted in Melanesian political culture, and that in interpreting contemporary political developments in independent Melanesia non-Melanesian observers should be aware that in part what they are observing is the assertion of that Melanesian style (cf. Quiros 1979 in reviewing Standish 1979).

[5] This paper was presented at a seminar at the ANU in 1980 and published in R.J. May and Hank Nelson (eds), Melanesia Beyond Diversity (1982).

[6] On the concept of political culture see Almond and Verba (1963), Pye and Verba (1965), Almond and Powell (1966:chapter 3), Kavanagh (1972). This writing might be compared with the earlier literature on ‘national character’, of which there is an extensive review in Inkeles and Levinson (1969).

[7] The personality-and-politics literature is well reviewed in Greenstein (1969, 1975). There is also an extensive bibliography in Hermann (1977). For specific comments on aggregative analyses of personality and politics see Greenstein (1969:120-140; 1975:60-68). Probably the best known study of personality and politics in ‘transitional societies’, is that of Pye (1962); there is also some interesting material in Legge (1973).

[8] See papers in May and Nelson (1982 vol 1).

[9] The closest to a coherent statement of ‘the Melanesian Way’ which I have been able to locate is a piece by Bernard Narokobi in Post-Courier 22 October 1974 but there is constant reference to it in papers in May (1973) and Lawrence (1975) has written about it. A similar philosophy is expounded in The Pacific Way (Tupouniua et al. 1975). The Melanesian Way philosophy is, of course, embodied in the Papua New Guinea government’s Eight Aims and in the preamble to its constitution. [After this paper was written a volume on the Melanesian Way, by Narokobi, was published by the Institute of Papuan New Guinea Studies, Port Moresby (Narokobi 1980).]

The Melanesian Way

NEC Approves Revitalized Village Courts Strategy

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Approved for Release:

Friday, 27th November, 2020

The National Executive Council has recently approved the Crime Prevention through Revitalized Village Courts System Strategy 2020-2030.

This was announced recently by Prime Minister, Hon. James Marape, MP, saying the transformation and revitalization of this first level of judiciary system by approving this strategy will allow Village Court officials and Land Mediators to deal with issues in a more formal setting.

Prime Minister Marape said this will give prominence to the Village Courts system as the forefront of the government’s justice service mechanism in all communities of both urban and rural settings of the country.

“It will formally recognize the Village Court officials as equal and active members of the PNG Law & Justice Sector, performing their mandated roles and responsibilities to achieve the sector’s common goals and objectives.

“The Village Courts system has been facilitating the settlement of disputes in communities of both urban and rural settings throughout Papua New Guinea for decades before and since independence, through the use of good customary conflict resolution techniques plus new legislations, and has proven to be very effective,” Prime Minister Marape said.

He said this will also allow empowerment and capacity building of Village Court officials to perform to their utmost potential as judicial officials; boosting their moral and enhancing performance.

Hence, realizing the purpose of this Village Courts system in maintaining peace in our communities.

“This strategy also aims to mobilize the village courts and non-state actors to implement crime prevention initiatives within our communities.

“It will further enable good management and safe keeping of court records,” Prime Minister Marape said.

The Prime Minister also said Cabinet has approved an appropriation of K7.2 million annually for the next 10 years for the successful implementation of the Crime Prevention through Revitalized Village Courts System Strategy.

Ends.

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Sorcery is True and Real in New Guinea: Three Admited They Killed an Elder

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Three Sorcerers Who Acknowledged of Killing a Tribal Elder
Three Sorcerers Who Acknowledged of Killing a Tribal Elder

Three Sorceress Admitted that they have mistakenly taken the life of a Village Chief in Egenda Village, in Nipa Southern Highlands Province.

Source: Kowi Wolin Korit

A village chief ( late Wolin Korit) who passed away late last month had no symptoms of illness, he was at the age of 50-55 years old when he passed on. He was returning from market place when he suddenly collapsed and died.

With great despair, the sons of the late chief used a traditional ritual called Tombol “Bamboo stick” ( which is still actively used in the Wola area) to identify the causes of their fathers sudden death.

Surprisingly the Bamboo pointed to one of the three sorceress who were involved in taking the life of the innocent man.

Surprisingly the woman admitted that three of them mistakenly took out the heart of the late chief. She pointed out another two of her comrades and all of them admitted that they have eaten the heart of Late Wolin Korit.

Most of you may not agree but Sorcery is real!

Let’s define sorcery first; according to the Oxford Dictionary; Sorcery is supernatural power or the ability to use supernatural powers—witchcraft or magic. The word sorcery often (though not always) refers to so-called black magic—magic used for evil purposes. It’s a spiritual manifestation!

However, the sons of the late chief decided not to do anything with the three women but they have advised the women to refrain from practising Sorcery and do compensation for the deceased.

The picture attached herein shows the three women being brought to the Ples Sing2 for indept interrogation without any harm.

First time in the history of Sorcery related killings and torturing, the three women were kept safely by the tribesmen.

Don’t spread false rumors;the women are not tortured, they are only being questioned.

Besides all the three women admitted that they have eaten the heart of Late Wolin Korit.

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Yairus Nggwijangge, Ndugama Regency Regent Murdered in Hospital in Jakarta

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On 14 November 2020, Indonesia Special Forces murdered Yairus Nggwijangge, the leader of Ndugama Regency strongly suspected using poison.

He suddenly passed away Jakarta hospital

This kind of the method of murder has been happening in West Papua. So many leaders have been killed with the same method, to wipe out Melanesian ethnic from our ancestral land of West Papua and replace them with pure Indonesians or half-Melanesians like Paulus Waterpauw, John Banua, Yoris Raweyay, John Palulu Tabo, and many other half-Melanesians who are occupying West Papua political arena.

We urge International community to help, take attention against current situation developing in West Papua.

We are in humanitarian crises, many tribal elders, many politicians and many educated Melanesians, many pastors and priests from protestants and catholic have been murdered by open gun-fire as well as silently using poisons.

Nature Care

The burning scar: Inside the destruction of Asia’s last rainforests

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Petrus Kinggo walks through the thick lowland rainforest in the Boven Digoel Regency.

“This is our mini market,” he says, smiling. “But unlike in the city, here food and medicine are free.”

The rich rainforest in Papua, among the most biodiverse places on earth, is threatened by deforestation
The rich rainforest in Papua, among the most biodiverse places on earth, is threatened by deforestation

Mr Kinggo is an elder in the Mandobo tribe. His ancestors have lived off these forests in Papua, Indonesia for centuries. Along with fishing and hunting, the sago starch extracted from palms growing wild here provided the community with their staple food. Their home is among the most biodiverse places on earth, and the rainforest is sacred and essential to the indigenous tribes.

Six years ago, Mr Kinggo was approached by South Korean palm oil giant Korindo, which asked him to help persuade his tribe and 10 other clans to accept just 100,000 rupiah ($8; £6) per hectare in compensation for their land. The company arrived with permits from the government and wanted a “quick transaction” with indigenous landholders, according to Mr Kinggo. And the promise of development was coupled with subtle intimidation, he said.

“The military and police came to my house, saying I had to meet with the company. They said they didn’t know what would happen to me if I didn’t.”

When he did, they made him personal promises as well, he said. As a co-ordinator, he would receive a new house with clean water and a generator, and have his children’s school fees paid.

His decision would change his community forever.

Petrus Kinggo struck a deal with Korindo to sell part of the land his tribe had lived off for generations
Petrus Kinggo struck a deal with Korindo to sell part of the land his tribe had lived off for generations

Indonesia is the world’s largest exporter of palm oil, and Papua is its newest frontier. The archipelago has experienced one of the fastest rates of deforestation in the world – vast areas of forest have been cleared to make way for row upon row of oil palm tree, growing a product found in everything from shampoo to biscuits. Indonesia’s palm oil exports were worth about $19bn (£14bn) last year, according to data from Gapki, the nation’s palm oil association.

The rich forests in the remote province of Papua had until recently escaped relatively untouched, but the government is now rapidly opening the area to investors, vowing to bring prosperity to one of the poorest regions in the country. Korindo controls more land in Papua than any other conglomerate. The company has cleared nearly 60,000 hectares of forests inside its government-granted concessions – an area the size of Chicago or Seoul – and the company’s vast plantation there is protected by state security forces.

Companies like Korindo have to clear the land in these concessions to allow them to replant new palms. Using fire to do that – the so-called “slash and burn” technique – is illegal in Indonesia due to the air pollution it causes and the high risk blazes will get out of control.

Korindo denies setting fires, saying it follows the law. A 2018 report by the leading global green timber certification body – the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), of which Korindo is a certificate holder – concluded there was no evidence that illegal and deliberate fires were set by the company.

But according to a new investigation by the Forensic Architecture group at Goldsmiths University in London and Greenpeace International, published in conjunction with the BBC, there is evidence that indicates deliberate burning on the land during the land-clearing period. The investigation found evidence of fires on one of Korindo’s concessions over a period of years in patterns consistent with deliberate use.

Forensic Architecture uses spatial and architectural analysis and advanced modelling and research techniques to investigate human rights violations and environmental destruction. “This is a robust technique that can with a high level of certainty determine if a fire is intentional or not,” said senior researcher Samaneh Moafi. “This allows us to hold the large corporations – who have been setting fires systematically for years now – liable in the court,” she said.

The group used satellite imagery to study the pattern of land clearing inside a Korindo concession called PT Dongin Prabhawa. They used the imagery to study the so-called “normalised burn ratio”, comparing it to hotspot data in the same area – intense heat sources picked up by Nasa satellites, and put the two datasets together over the same period of time, 2011 to 2016.

“We found that the pattern, the direction and the speed with which fires had moved matched perfectly with the pattern, the speed, direction with which land clearing happened. This suggests that the fires were set intentionally,” Samaneh Moafi said.

“If the fires were set from outside the concession or due to weather conditions, they would have moved with a different directionality. But in the cases that we were looking at there was a very clear directionality,” she said.BBC

Watch how the Forensic Architecture Group established what was happening in Papua
Video captionWatch how the Forensic Architecture Group established what was happening in Papua
BBC

Korindo turned down several BBC interview requests, but the company said in a statement that all land clearing was carried out with heavy machinery rather than fires.

It said there were many natural fires in the region due to extreme dryness, and claimed that any fires in its concessions had been started by “villagers hunting giant wild rats hiding under stacks of wood”.

But locals near the concession in Papua told the BBC the company had set fires on the concessions over a period of years, during a timeframe which matched the findings of the visual investigation.

Sefnat Mahuze, a local farmer, said he saw Korindo employees collecting leftover wood, “the worthless stuff”.

“They piled up long rows, maybe 100-200 metres long, and then they poured petrol over it and then lit them,” he said.

Another villager, Esau Kamuyen, said the smoke from the fires “closed the world around them, shutting off the sky”.

According to Greenpeace International, companies are rarely held to account for slash and burn – a practice that almost every year creates a smoky haze in Indonesia which can end up blanketing the entire South East Asian region, causing airports and schools to close.

A Harvard University study estimated that the worst fires in decades in 2015 were linked to more than 90,000 early deaths. The fires that year are also believed to have produced more carbon emissions in just a few months than the entire United States economy.BBC

Papua is home to the largest rainforests in Indonesia
Papua is home to the largest rainforests in Indonesia

Many of the tribal allegations against Korindo were investigated for two years by the Forest Stewardship Council. The regulator’s tree logo – found on paper products throughout the UK and Europe – is meant to tell consumers the product is sourced from ethnically and sustainable companies. The FSC report into allegations against Korindo was never published, after legal threats from the company, but the BBC obtained a copy.

The report found “evidence beyond reasonable doubt” that Korindo’s palm oil operation destroyed 30,000 hectares of high conservation forest in breach of FSC regulations; that Korindo was, “on the balance of probability … supporting the violation of traditional and human rights for its own benefit”; and was “directly benefitting from the military presence to gain an unfair economic advantage” by “providing unfair compensation rates to communities”.

“There was no doubt that Korindo had been in violation of our rules. That was very clear,” Kim Carstensen, the FSC’s executive director, told the BBC at the group’s headquarters in Germany.

The report recommended unequivocally that Korindo be expelled from the body. But the recommendation was rejected by the FSC board – a move environmental groups say undermined the credibility of the organisation. A letter sent to the FSC board in August, signed by 19 local environmental groups, said the groups could no long rely on the body “to be a useful certification tool to promote forest conservation and respect for community rights and livelihoods”.

Mr Carstensen, the executive director, defended the decision to allow Korindo to stay. “These things have happened, right? Is the best thing to do to say they were in breach of our values so we’re not going to have anything to do with you anymore?” he said.

“The logic of the board has been, ‘We want to see the improvements happen’.”

Korindo strongly denied that the company was involved in any human rights violations but acknowledged there was room for improvements and said it was implementing new grievance procedures.

It said it had paid fair compensation to tribes and that it had paid an additional $8 per hectare for the loss of trees – a sum decided by the Indonesian government, which granted them the concession. The BBC tried to confirm the figure with the Indonesian government, but officials declined to comment on Korindo.

Workers on one of Korindo's palm oil plantations, picking up the palm oil fruit
Workers on one of Korindo’s palm oil plantations, picking up the palm oil fruit

The Indonesian government maintains generally that Papua is an integral part of the nation, recognised by the international community. The province, which is half of the island of New Guinea (the other half belongs to the country of Papua New Guinea), became part of Indonesia after a controversial referendum overseen by the UN in 1969, in which just 1,063 tribal elders were selected to vote.

Since then, control over Papua’s rich natural resources has become a flashpoint in a long-running, low-level separatist conflict. Papuan activists call the 1969 referendum the “act of no choice”.

The Indonesian military has been accused by activist groups of gross human rights abuses in its attempts to suppress dissent in Papua and protect business interests there. Foreign observers are rarely granted access, “because there is something that the state wants to hide”, according to Andreas Harsono, an Indonesian researcher with the US-based Human Rights Watch.

“They are hiding human rights abuses, environmental degradation, deforestation,” he said. “And the marginalisation of indigenous people – economically, socially and politically.”

In an attempt to ease tensions, Papua was granted greater autonomy in 2001, and there has been a significant increase in government funds for the region, with Jakarta vowing to bring prosperity to the people of Papua and saying it is committed to resolving past rights abuses.

"The company didn’t bring prosperity," said Elisabeth Ndiwaen. "What they did was create conflict."
“The company didn’t bring prosperity,” said Elisabeth Ndiwaen. “What they did was create conflict.”

Derek Ndiwaen was one of those in the Mandobo tribe who, like Petrus Kinggo, took money from Korindo for their land. Derek’s sister Elisabeth was away at the time, working in the city, and she didn’t find out about the deal until she returned home. According to Elisabeth, Derek became embroiled in conflict with other tribes over the land deals. She believes the stress played a role in his death.

“My brother would never have sold his pride or forest before,” she said, through tears. “The company didn’t bring prosperity. What they did was create conflict, and my brother was the victim.”

Elisabeth said that her brother was also made promises of free schooling for his children and health care for the family – promises she said were never realised.

“The forest is gone and we are living in poverty,” she said. “After our forest has been sold you would think we would be living a good life. But here in 2020 we are not.”

According to Elisabeth, Korindo told the community it would build good roads and provide clean water.

But residents in her village of Nakias, in the Ngguti district say life hadn’t changed the way they hoped. There’s no clean running water or electricity in the village. Those that can afford it use generators but fuel costs four times as much as in the capital Jakarta.BBC

Environmental activists fear for the Papua rainforest - among the most biodiverse places in the world
Environmental activists fear for the Papua rainforest – among the most biodiverse places in the world

Korindo said that the company directly employs more than 10,000 people and has put $14m (£11m) into social projects in Papua, including food programmes for malnourished children and scholarships.

The company has stopped all further clearing until an assessment of high conservation and high carbon stock forests inside their concessions is carried out.

“The bigger question of what to do with the sins of the past will take a bit of time,” said Kim Carstensen, the FSC chairman. “Whether it’s two years, three years – that I don’t know.”

Elisabeth fears that nothing will make up for the destruction of the rainforest.

“When I see that our ancestral forest is all cleared, chopped down, it’s heart-breaking,” she said. “It should have been passed on to the next generation.”

“I walk through the plantation crying, and ask myself, where are our ancestors’ spirits now that our forest has been completely destroyed. And it happened under my watch.”BBC

Petrus Kinggo's nephew and his generation will inherit a scarred landscape in Papua
Petrus Kinggo’s nephew and his generation will inherit a scarred landscape in PapuaBBC

Petrus Kinggo did receive money from Korindo, he said – about $42,000 (£32,000), equal to 17 years’ pay on the provincial monthly minimum wage. And the company paid for one of his eight children’s school fees until 2017. He said he did not receive a house or a generator, and the money is all gone.

“I have nothing left,” he said. “Uncles, nephews, in-laws, grandchildren, brothers, sisters all took some. And then I spent what was left on my own children’s education.”

Thousands of hectares of the Mandobo tribe’s once vast rainforest has been logged and replaced with neat rows of oil palm trees. A further 19,000 hectares now inside a Korindo concession is earmarked for clearing.

Mr Kinggo is fighting to save some of what’s left. He fears future generations will have to “live off money” rather than the forest. He blames the government for not consulting with the villagers before giving the concession to Korindo and “sending them here to pressure us”.

But when he walks through the forest now, he looks inside, and the money he took weighs on him.

“According to God I have sinned, I deceived 10 tribes,” he said.

“The company said, ‘Thank you Petrus for looking after us so well’. But in my heart I knew I had done wrong.”

BBC

You can watch a film version of this story, The Burning Scar, in the UK on the BBC News Channel on the 21/22 November 2020 at 21:30 GMT and at various times this weekend on BBC World News.

You can also listen to the radio documentary on the BBC World Service here .

Source: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/

World

Muammar Gaddafi Was Assassinated In A Western-Backed Coup To Prevent The Establishment Of The “African Dinar” But His Legacy Lives On

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By Malick El Shabbaz

Muammar Gaddafi Was Assassinated
Muammar Gaddafi Was Assassinated

Colonel Gaddafi or Muammar Gaddafi was a well-known Libyan politician and revolutionary. From 1969 to 1977, he ruled Libya as ‘Revolutionary Chairman’ then he switched to serve as the ‘Brotherly Leader’ from 1977 to 2011. Since an early age, he showed the signs of becoming a revolutionary despite coming from an underprivileged family. ‘National Transitional Council’ was a result of Gaddafi’s increased dominance, violation of human rights, and support to international terrorism that eventually dethroned Gaddafi and led to his untimely demise.

Libya descended into chaos since the fall of Muamar Gaddafi and western powers been scrambling over Libya’s natural resources which Gaddafi protected.

Muammar Gaddafi was assassinated in a western-backed coup to prevent the establishment of the “African Dinar” … A Pan-African Currency backed by African gold and mineral wealth that would undermine the West’s fiat monetary system and alter the global economic and financial environment. The African monetary system proposed by Gaddafi would’ve wiped out poverty from Africa, or at least reduce it’ll reduce poverty drastically across African nations.

Since Gaddafi was assassinated, no African leader speaks about his single African monetary project, a single military force and a single passport for all Africans to move freely around the continent of Africa! That was Gaddafi’s one of the greatest Pan-African goals. Its obvious that the breeds of African leaders we have today are puppets and they can’t summon the courage to challenge the West neo-colonialism and its hegemony in Africa like Gaddafi did. I shall continue to insist that our sovereign African countries work together to achieve the “United States Of Africa” with a single military force, a single currency and a passport for Africans to move freely around . Its better for an African to be hated and killed for having gut like a Lion, than to live cowardly on your knees forever like a sheep!

Muammar Al Gaddafi, your memory lives on in the hearts of Pan-Africanists.

The Lion of the Desert.

World

Ahmed Sekou Toure: An Indispensable Yet Forgotten African Heroic Leader

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Ahmed Sekou Toure
Ahmed Sekou Toure

Ahmed Sekou Toure, who was the leader of the Democratic Party of Guinea, was the president of Guinea after its independence and his revolutionary stance was deeply rooted in radical socialism. He opposed the De Gaulle referendum in 1958 and that was the turning point in the crumbling of the old French West African Federation. He was born in January 9th 1922, and died in 26th March 1984 while receiving treatment in the US

He was a Guinean politician and a Pan Africanist who played a key role in the African independence movement. As the first president of Guinea, he led his country to gain its independence from France in 1958. He was known as a charismatic and radical figure in Africa’s post-colonial history.

Toure’s activism for independence and decolonization efforts calumniated into Independence in 1958, when an overwhelming population of Guinea voted in favour of independence, rejecting French President Charles de Gaulle’s offer of joining a new federal community.

Toure’s words regarding de Gaulle’s offer strongly resonated across the Guinean public. He famously said: ”Guinea prefers poverty in freedom than riches in slavery.” It was a comment that angered de Gaulle.

”Then all you have to do is to vote ‘no’. I pledge myself that nobody will stand in the way of your independence,” Gaulle said in response to Toure’s assertion.

Guinea became the first independent French-speaking state in Africa and it was the only country which did not accept the proposal of the French president.

In 1958, Toure became the first president of what became known as The Republic of Guinea.

The French reacted by recalling all their professional people and civil servants and by removing all transportable equipment. As France threatened Toure and Guinea through economic pressure, Toure accepted support from the communist bloc and at the same time sought help from Western nations.

Sekou Toure’s Background:

Born in 1922 in Faranah, Guinea, Toure came from humble origins. His parents were uneducated and poor. Some sources say he was the grandson of Samory Toure, the legendary leader who resisted France in the late 19th Century.

Toure practiced the Muslim faith from his childhood, attending a Koranic school as well as French primary schools. At the age of 14, he displayed the spark of political activism as he led a student revolt against a French Technical school at Conakry from where he was later dismissed.

In 1940, he started working as a clerk at a company called Niger Français. In the following year he took an administrative assignment in the postal service where his interest in labour movement started increasing. Toure formed close ties with senior labour leaders and organised 76 days of the first successful strike in French-controlled Western Africa.

Then, in 1945, he became secretary-general of the Post and Telecommunications Workers’ Union and participated in the foundation of the Federation of Workers’ Union of Guinea which was linked to the World Federation of Trade Unions. He eventually became the vice president of the union.

In order to realise his aim in politics, Toure helped Felix Houphouet of Ivory Coast to form the African Democratic Rally in 1946. A strong orator, he was elected to the French National Assembly in 1951 as the representative of Guinea. How was prevented from taking his seat in the assembly, however.

He was re-elected in the following year but again prevented from taking his seat. When he was elected as mayor of Conakry by getting a majority of votes in 1955, he was finally permitted to take his place in the National Assembly.

Once he became president of Guinea, he worked toward establishing unity with Ghana but couldn’t achieve much on that front. In 1966, when Ghana’s President Kwame Nkrumah was ousted in 1966, Toure gave him asylum. He then faced a failed attack from its neighbour; Portuguese Guinea (today Guinea Bissau). Soon after he started intimidation policies against the opposition.

In post-independence Ghana, Toure won most elections, ruling the country for 26 years. Despite taking a tough stance against opposition parties, he was known as a genial leader on the international stage.

He was tasked with leading the mediation board of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation during the Iraq-Iran war. He became a powerful figure in the Organization of African Unity and played a vital role in the France-Africa summit which took place in France.

In 1984, he died during heart surgery in Cleveland, United States.

Some of his published books are: La Revolution et l’unite populaire (1946; Revolution and People Unity); Les poemes militants (1964; Militant Poems).

Below are some of his memorable quotes:

“An African statesman is not a naked boy begging from rich capitalists.”
“Without being Communists, we believe that the analytical qualities of Marxism and the organization of the people are methods especially well-suited for our country.”

Ahmed Sékou Touré, first president of Guinea, as quoted in ‘Guinea: Trouble in Erewhon’, Time, Friday 13 December 1963.

“The private trader has a greater sense of responsibility than civil servants, who get paid at the end of each month and only once in a while think of the nation or their own responsibility.”

Ahmed Sékou Touré, first president of Guinea, as quoted in ‘Guinea: Trouble in Erewhon’, Time, Friday 13 December 1963.

“We ask you therefore, not to judge us or think of us in terms of what we were — or even of what we are — but rather to think of us in terms of history and what we will be tomorrow.”

Ahmed Sékou Touré, first president of Guinea, as quoted in Rolf Italiaander’s The New Leaders of Africa, New Jersey, 1961

“We should go down to the grassroots of our culture, not to remain there, not to be isolated there, but to draw strength and substance there from, and with whatever additional sources of strength and material we acquire, proceed to set up a new form of society raised to the level of human progress.”

Ahmed Sékou Touré, as quoted in Osei Amoah’s A Political Dictionary of Black Quotations, published in London, 1989.

“To take part in the African revolution it is not enough to write a revolutionary song: you must fashion the revolution with the people. And if you fashion it with the people, the songs will come by themselves.”

Ahmed Sékou Touré, as quoted in Osei Amoah’s A Political Dictionary of Black Quotations, published in London, 1989.

“At sunset when you pray to God, say over and over that each man is a brother and that all men are equal.”

Ahmed Sékou Touré, as quoted in Robin Hallett’s, Africa Since 1875, University of Michigan Press, 1974.

“We have told you bluntly, Mr President, what the demands of the people are … We have one prime and essential need: our dignity. But there is no dignity without freedom … We prefer freedom in poverty to opulence in slavery.”

Ahmed Sékou Touré’s statement to General De Gaulle during the French leaders visit to Guinea in August 1958, as quoted in Robin Hallett’s, Africa Since 1875, University of Michigan Press, 1974.

“For the first twenty years, we in Guinea have concentrated on developing the mentality of our people. Now we are ready to move on to other business.”

Ahmed Sékou Touré. as quoted in David Lamb’s The Africans, New York 1985.

“I don’t know what people mean when they call me the bad child of Africa. Is it that they consider us unbending in the fight against imperialism, against colonialism? If so, we can be proud to be called headstrong. Our wish is to remain a child of Africa unto our death..”

Ahmed Sékou Touré, as quoted in David Lamb’s The Africans, New York 1985.

“People of Africa, from now on you are reborn in history, because you mobilize yourself in the struggle and because the struggle before you restores to your own eyes and renders to you, justice in the eyes of the world.”

Ahmed Sékou Touré, as quoted in ‘The Permanent Struggle’, The Black Scholar, Vol 2 No 7, March 1971.

“[T]he political leader is, by virtue of his communion of idea and action with his people, the representative of his people, the representative of a culture.”

Ahmed Sékou Touré, as quoted in Molefi Kete Asante and Kariamu Welsh Asante’s African Culture the Rhythms of Unity: The Rhythms of Unity Africa, World Press, October 1989.

“In the history of this new Africa which has just come into the world, Liberia has a preeminent place because she has been for each of our peoples the living proof that our liberty was possible. And nobody can ignore the fact that the star which marks the Liberian national emblem has been hanging for more than a century — the sole star that illuminated our night of dominated peoples.”

Ahmed Sékou Touré, from his ‘Liberian Independence Day Address’ of 26 July 1960, as quoted in Charles Morrow Wilson’s Liberia: Black Africans in Microcosm, Harper and Row, 1971.

“‘People are not born with racial prejudices. For example, children have none. Racial questions are questions of education. Africans learned racism form the European. Is it any wonder that they now think in terms of race — after all they’ve gone through under colonialism?”

Ahmed Sékou Touré, first president of Guinea, as quoted in Rolf Italiaander’s The New Leaders of Africa, New Jersey, 1961

Source: https://usafrikagov.com/

Melanesia

Port Moresby: I have seen too many Evictions

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Eviction in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea
Eviction in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea

In the past 10 years I have been and seen alot of our Papua new Guinea citizens been treated like criminals and been evicted like aminals and it breaks my heart when I see kids crying and mothers when everything they have built is taken down by police and dozers and there is nothing you can do about it.

Yes the first thing people will say is, “send them back to the village”. The only problem with this is most are 2nd or 3rd generation Highlanders and NGI who have been in the city since birth.
The only reason why people buy blocks and settle in settlements is because there is no other option for citizens. What are they supposed to do when rentals are so high and the cost of the proper land and house is over K400,000. Government has no solutions.
Everyone wants a proper home and our national Government must breach the gap for citizens with a policy that will give solve the following. 1 Family 1 home.
1. Aquire land in NCD and Central Province
2. Land owners and ILG clans be partners in any land development with the state in at rate share agreement.
3. Government puts all trunk infrastructure into the new suburbs, Eda Ranu, PNG power, Telikom. Roads.
4. Each family is identified and land given as equity for small working class families.
5. Government subsidies should cut first home buyers to about K150,000 per home. With BSP facilities it should be accessible since the land is purchased by the government.
I can’t wait until our citizens live in proper structured housing estates, that is the PNG dream. 2017 I put my hand up with my policy team Martin and Francis we have a working policy that will work only problem is political willingness to achieve all our dreams to own our own home.
Good night please my sisters and brothers do you live in block, renting, living with family and wantoks or do you own your own home??
Melanesia

Ancient ‘trace’ in Papuan genomes suggests previously unknown expansion out of Africa

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Several major studies, published today, concur that virtually all current global human populations stem from a single wave of expansion out of Africa. Yet one has found 2% of the genome in Papuan populations points to an earlier, separate dispersal event – and an extinct lineage that made it to the islands of Southeast Asia and Oceania.

A new study of human genomic diversity suggests there may have in fact been two successful dispersals out of Africa, and that a “trace” of the earlier of these two expansion events has lingered in the genetics of modern Papuans.

Three major genetic studies are published today in the same issue of Nature. All three agree that, for the most part, the genomes of contemporary non-African populations show signs of only one expansion of modern humans out of Africa: an event that took place sometime after 75,000 years ago.

Two of the studies conclude that, if there were indeed earlier expansions of modern humans out of Africa, they have left little or no genetic trace. The third, however, may have found that ‘trace’.

This study, led by Drs Luca Pagani and Toomas Kivisild from the University of Cambridge’s Department of Archaeology and Anthropology, has found a “genetic signature” in present-day Papuans that suggests at least 2% of their genome originates from an even earlier, and otherwise extinct, dispersal of humans out of Africa.

Papuans and Philippine Negritos are populations that inhabit Papua New Guinea and some of the surrounding islands in Southeast Asia and Oceania. In the genomes of these populations, the researchers discovered more of the African ‘haplotypes’ – groups of genes linked closely enough to be inherited from a single source – than in any other present-day population.

Extensive analysis on the extra 2% of African haplotypes narrowed down the split between African (Yoruban) and Papuan lineages to around 120,000 years ago – a remarkable 45,000 years prior to the very earliest that the main African expansion could have occurred.

The study analysed genomic diversity in 125 human populations at an unprecedented level of detail, based on 379 high resolution whole genome sequences from across the world generated by an international collaboration led by the Cambridge team and colleagues from the Estonian Biocentre.

Lead researcher Luca Pagani said: “Papuans share for most part same evolutionary history as all other non-Africans, but our research shows they may also contain some remnants of a chapter that is also yet to be described.

“While our research is in almost complete agreement with all other groups with regard to a single out-of-Africa event, this scenario cannot fully account for some genetic peculiarities in the Papuan genomes we analysed.”

Pagani says the sea which separates the ‘ecozones’ of Asia and Australasia may have played a part: “The Wallace line is a channel of deep sea that was never dry during the ice ages. This constant barrier may have contributed to isolating and hence preserving the traces of the otherwise extinct lineage in Papuan populations.”

Toomas Kivisild said: “We believe that at least one additional human expansion out of Africa took place before the major one described in our research and others. These people diverged from the rest of Africans about 120,000 years ago, colonising some land outside of Africa. The 2% of the Papuan genome is the only remaining trace of this otherwise extinct lineage.”

The Estonian Biocentre’s Dr Mait Metspalu said: “This endeavour was uniquely made possible by the anonymous sample donors and the collaboration effort of nearly one hundred researchers from 74 different research groups from all over the world.”

Metspalu’s colleague Richard Villems added: “Overall this work provides an invaluable contribution to the understanding of our evolutionary past and to the challenges that humans faced when settling down in ever-changing environments.”

Researchers say the deluge of freely available data will serve as future starting point to further studies on the genetic history of modern and ancient human populations.

World

Brazil drastically reduces controls over suspicious Amazon timber exports

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  • Forest degradation nearly doubled in the Brazilian Amazon last year, rising from 4,946 square kilometers in 2018, to 9,167 square kilometers in 2019. Experts say this is likely due to soaring illegal timber harvesting and export under President Jair Bolsonaro.
  • To facilitate illegal harvesting of rare and valuable timber, like that of the Ipê tree, whose wood can sell for up to $2,500 per cubic meter at Brazilian export terminals, Bolsonaro’s environment officials have reversed regulations that formerly outlawed suspicious timber shipments, making most such exports legal.
  • Experts say that the relaxation of illegal export regulations not only protects the criminal syndicates cutting the trees in Amazonia, but also shields exporter Brazil, and importers in the EU, UK, US and elsewhere, preventing them from being accused of causing Amazon deforestation via their supply chains.
  • Activists fear overturned timber export regulations will embolden illegal loggers, who will escalate invasions onto indigenous and traditional lands, as well as within conservation units. More than 300 people were assassinated over the past decade as the result of land and natural resource conflicts in the Brazilian Amazon.
IBAMA logging inspection in Uruará, Pará state in October 2017. Since Jair Bolsonaro came to power on 1 January 2019, budget cuts have resulted in regulatory field operations being severely curtailed. Image courtesy of IBAMA.

At the end of last year, Brazilian environmentalist Carlos Rittl sent out a perplexed tweet, accompanied by a graph, showing that forest degradation had almost doubled in the Brazilian Amazon in 2019 under the government of Jair Bolsonaro.

Forest degradation soared to 9,167 square kilometers (3,540 square miles) last year as compared to 4,946 square kilometers (1,910 square miles) in 2018, based on data obtained from Deter-B, the satellite monitoring system used by Brazil’s International Institute for Space Research (INPE) to detect near real-time deforestation.

Forest degradation in the Amazon and elsewhere in Brazil often gets its start when loggers hack out rough tracks into the forest to cut and remove valuable timber. Even though the loggers leave most trees untouched, the forest loses almost as much biodiversity as it would if it were clear-cut. It also becomes more vulnerable to drought and forest fires.

In recent years, forest degradation was significantly curbed by Brazil’s strict rules blocking suspicious timber exports. What changed and caused the sudden surge in 2019, Rittl wondered?

Amazon timber allegedly illegally harvested in Pará state. Note the lack of license plates. Image by Sue Branford.

Rejiggering timber export regulations

The environmentalist got the answer to his query last week when Reuters reported that during 2019 Brazil exported “thousands of cargoes of wood from an Amazonian port without authorization from the federal environment agency [IBAMA], increasing the risk that they originated from illegally deforested land.” An IBAMA employee told Reuters off-the-record that at one port in Pará, over half of the timber exported last year was not authorized.

According to a report published by the news website, Intercept Brasil, the IBAMA office in Pará tried to fix this embarrassing revelation, not by tightening its monitoring procedures, but by relaxing its regulations, turning what looked suspiciously like illegal imports into legal shipments abroad.

The report revealed that, in February, Walter Mendes Magalhães Junior, a retired military police officer from São Paulo state, who last October was appointed IBAMA Superintendent for Pará State (despite lacking experience in environmental regulation), had issued a retroactive export license for five containers of suspicious timber being held by customs authorities in the U.S., Belgium and Denmark.

The timber belonged to Tradelink, a British company, which boasts on its website of its “27 years of experience” and “its high quality product lines.” With Magalhães’ action, Tradelink salvaged cargoes together worth R$795,000 (US$168,258). In a document written at the time, Magalhães said that his help to Tradelink was not a one-off, as he would take similar “emergency action” to help “other companies that found themselves in a similar situation.”

When questioned by Intercept Brasil, Magalhães said that Tradelink had asked for export authorization, but IBAMA had not been able to deal with the request in a timely fashion. Magalhães explained that, with “very few employees,” IBAMA could not respond adequately to the “huge demands” it faced. As a result, the agency’s investigative oversight was summarily bypassed.

IBAMA Superintendent for Pará State, Walter Mendes Magalhães Junior. Image by Denis Bonelli / SSP.

Legalizing deforestation with a pen stroke

These irregular exports of hard timber are not limited to Pará state. Alexandre Saraiva, head of the federal police for Amazonas state, sounded an alarm at a press conference after carrying out two operations to combat export fraud last September. He estimated that 90% of timber leaving Legal Amazônia was being illegally harvested. Legal Amazônia is vast — covering all, or parts, of nine Brazilian states.

After a public outcry surrounding events in Pará, environmentalists expected Eduardo Bim, IBAMA’s president under the Bolsonaro administration, to allocate more staff to monitor timber exports to ensure that such flouting of regulations didn’t occur in future. However, Bim reacted very differently, navigating a bureaucratic exit from the conundrum similar to the one adopted by Magalhães.

Bim took advantage of the lack of press scrutiny during Carnival at the end of February by quietly revoking a 2011 IBAMA policy requiring agency authorization before forest products could be given an export licence. Now authorization will only be required for species of trees threatened with extinction or in other special circumstances. In effect, he opened the spigot wide for large scale illegal timber shipments from the Brazilian Amazon.

Annual area of degraded Brazilian Amazon forest through selective logging from 2015-2019. Data provided by INPE, image by Carlos Ritll and Infoclima on Twitter.

With the stroke of a pen, Bim ensured that all future unauthorized timber exports, previously regarded as illegal, would become legal. But, despite this bureaucratic sleight of hand, the likelihood remains just as high as ever that this now “legal” timber will have been illegally logged from indigenous territories or protected land, as nothing on the ground has changed. The rule revision horrified some IBAMA staff. According to Reuters, Bim overruled the opinion of five IBAMA experts.

According to Intercept Brasil, Bim made his decision in response to demands from Brazil’s timber industry. The Centre of Pará Industries, a lobbying group, celebrated Bim’s action in a press release saying that the measure “put in order exports of legal and authorized timber from Brazil and, particularly, Amazônia.”

But Bim’s actions made many IBAMA staff very unhappy. One employee, who spoke to Intercept Brasil off-the-record, said that personnel burst out laughing when Bim told them they will have access “a posteriori” (that is, after the event) to export data provided by the companies. “What use will it be then?” lamented the employee.

What some IBAMA staff and environmentalists fear is that this regulatory manipulation will effectively “launder” questionable timber, not only protecting illegal loggers at the wood’s point of origin, but also sparing the nation of Brazil from deforestation accusations. At the same time, it will shield countries and major retailers receiving the valued timber at the far end of the supply chain in the EU, UK, US and elsewhere, preventing their green reputations from being linked to, and tarnished by, illegal Amazon deforestation.

Bim was the first major appointment announced in December 2018 by Ricardo Salles, the soon-to-be environment minister under President Jair Bolsonaro. Salles has never hidden his siding with the timber industry, even when illegal loggers attacked IBAMA staff. Following the minister’s guidelines, Bim has made it difficult for IBAMA staff to talk to the press. After the recent reports by Reuters and Intercept Brasil, Bim reacted by repeating his demand that staff refer all press requests to IBAMA’s Department of Communications.

Ipê (Handroanthus albus), one of the most valuable tree species in the world, and a popular target of illegal loggers. Image by Hermínio Lacerda / Banco de Imagens do IBAMA.

Threat of violence

The lax new regulations will allow illegal logging crime syndicates to operate with a free hand in the Amazon, not even having to maintain a veneer of legality, say human rights activists who fear that violence will escalate as timber cutters invade the lands held by indigenous and traditional communities.

At the beginning of 2019, Amazon activists Osvalinda and Daniel Pereira, whose story has been reported by Mongabay, had to leave their plot of land in the Areia Settlement in the west of Pará due to increased death threats from illegal loggers. “The number of trucks transporting timber increased and with it the pressure on us,” said Osvalinda.

The couple lived at the center of an illegal timber hotspot. In 2017 alone, loggers using the road passing through the Areia Settlement illegally extracted an estimated 23,000 cubic meters (812,237 cubic feet) of ipê, an extremely valuable hardwood, from the Riozinho do Anfrísio Extractivist Reserve, according to the Brazilian NGO, Socioenvironmental Institute (ISA). The shipments were worth R$208 million (US$168,258).

Ipê is among the most valuable tree species in the world. The high value of Ipê wood —made into flooring or decking for upscale European or US homes — can sell for up to $2,500 per cubic meter at Brazilian export terminals. Loggers must penetrate deep into rainforests to harvest the trees, creating roads later used by other invaders.

The Human Rights Watch report, Rainforest Mafias – How Violence and Impunity Fuel Deforestation in Brazil’s Amazon, analyzed 28 assassinations and 40 cases of death threats in the region, and offered strong evidence that criminals see activists and resistors as an obstacle to illegal logging. One reason for the authorities’ failure to stem the violence, the Human Rights Watch concluded, is the recent weakening of environmental crime monitoring.

IBAMA officers conduct a timber inspection in the years before Bolsonaro took office. They measure the volume of timber and confirm botanical identification at a sawmill suspected of receiving illegal Ipê logs in Pará state. Experts say that fraud is likely occurring along the entire Brazilian timber supply chain. Image © Marizilda Cruppe / Greenpeace.

One indication of this weakening is the decline in penalties imposed by IBAMA for such crimes. In 2019, the number of environmental fines fell by 34% to 9,745, the lowest in 24 years. The value of the fines fell even more heavily, by 43%, to R$2.9 billion (US$614 million). This is the lowest level of fines since 1995, when Brazil was setting records for Amazon deforestation. If the past is any indication, those fines will go mostly uncollected, and eventually may be forgiven altogether.

Meanwhile, over the past decade, more than 300 people, many of them leading activists and leaders, were assassinated as the direct result of land and natural resource conflicts in the Brazilian Amazon, according to the Catholic Church’s Pastoral Land Commission (CPT).

People living in the forest today, in the midst of this brutal conflict and often far from law enforcement, now worry that the Bolsonaro administration’s weakening of regulations governing timber exports will leave them at the mercy of emboldened timber harvesting crime syndicates.

Osvalinda fears that human tragedy will come hot on the heels of 2019’s record levels of forest degradation. “With so many indications of growing impunity,” she says, “I can only think in great sadness that the next record to be broken will be the number of deaths in the countryside.”

Banner image caption: A raid by IBAMA agents — conducted previous to the Bolsonaro administration — seized this timber illegally harvested in an Amazon indigenous reserve. Image courtesy of IBAMA.

by Thais Borges and Sue Branford on 11 March 2020 Source: https://news.mongabay.com/