Category Archives: Melanesia

Descendants of Solomons’ slaves looking forward to dual citizenship

The descendants of Solomon Islands’ slave labourers living in Fiji say they hope dual citizenship legislation being proposed in the Solomons will help them reconnect with long lost relatives.

In the mid-nineteenth century more than 60,000 Pacific Islanders from Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, New Caledonia and Niue were coerced to work on canefields in Australia and Fiji through trickery and kidnapping, a practice known as Blackbirding.

A Solomon Islands government delegation doing consultations in Melanesia this week on dual citizenship met with leaders of descendants of blackbirded Solomon Islanders living in Fiji.

Chris Waiwori from the Dual-Citizenship Taskforce
Chris Waiwori from the Dual-Citizenship Taskforce Photo: PM Press Office

The secretary of the dual citizenship task force, Chris Waiwori, described the meeting as an emotional one during which community leaders told the delegation they appreciated the move towards dual citizenship and saw it as another avenue for them to try and mend their broken links to Solomon Islands.

The taskforce is now in PNG for the final leg of its consultations having earlier also visited Vanuatu.

A final round of local consultations on the dual citizenship bill will be done when the taskforce returns to Honiara before a final draft of the bill is submitted to cabinet.

The Solomon Islands prime minister Manasseh Sogavare had previously said he aimed to have the bill tabled in parliament early next year.

Source: RNZ

Genetic ‘trace’ in Papuan genomes suggests two expansions out of Africa

Date:September 21, 2016

Source: University of Cambridge

Summary:

A new study of human genomic diversity suggests there may have in fact been two successful dispersals out of Africa, and that a “trace” of the earlier of these two expansion events has lingered in the genetics of modern Papuans.  

Abstract:

A new study of human genomic diversity suggests there may have in fact been two successful dispersals out of Africa, and that a “trace” of the earlier of these two expansion events has lingered in the genetics of modern Papuans.  

Three major genetic studies are published today in the same issue of Nature. All three agree that, for the most part, the genomes of contemporary non-African populations show signs of only one expansion of modern humans out of Africa: an event that took place sometime after 75,000 years ago.   

Two of the studies conclude that, if there were indeed earlier expansions of modern humans out of Africa, they have left little or no genetic trace. The third, however, may have found that ‘trace’. 

This study, led by Drs Luca Pagani and Toomas Kivisild from the University of Cambridge’s Department of Archaeology and Anthropology, has found a “genetic signature” in present-day Papuans that suggests at least 2% of their genome originates from an even earlier, and otherwise extinct, dispersal of humans out of Africa.

Papuans and Philippine Negritos are populations that inhabit Papua New Guinea and some of the surrounding islands in Southeast Asia and Oceania. In the genomes of these populations, the researchers discovered more of the African ‘haplotypes’ – groups of genes linked closely enough to be inherited from a single source – than in any other present-day population.   

Extensive analysis on the extra 2% of African haplotypes narrowed down the split between African (Yoruban) and Papuan lineages to around 120,000 years ago – a remarkable 45,000 years prior to the very earliest that the main African expansion could have occurred.  

The study analysed genomic diversity in 125 human populations at an unprecedented level of detail, based on 379 high resolution whole genome sequences from across the world generated by an international collaboration led by the Cambridge team and colleagues from the Estonian Biocentre.   

Lead researcher Luca Pagani said: “Papuans share for most part same evolutionary history as all other non-Africans, but our research shows they may also contain some remnants of a chapter that is also yet to be described.

“While our research is in almost complete agreement with all other groups with regard to a single out-of-Africa event, this scenario cannot fully account for some genetic peculiarities in the Papuan genomes we analysed.”

Pagani says the sea which separates the ‘ecozones’ of Asia and Australasia may have played a part: “The Wallace line is a channel of deep sea that was never dry during the ice ages. This constant barrier may have contributed to isolating and hence preserving the traces of the otherwise extinct lineage in Papuan populations.”

Toomas Kivisild said: “We believe that at least one additional human expansion out of Africa took place before the major one described in our research and others. These people diverged from the rest of Africans about 120,000 years ago, colonising some land outside of Africa. The 2% of the Papuan genome is the only remaining trace of this otherwise extinct lineage.”

The Estonian Biocentre’s Dr Mait Metspalu said: “This endeavour was uniquely made possible by the anonymous sample donors and the collaboration effort of nearly one hundred researchers from 74 different research groups from all over the world.”

Metspalu’s colleague Richard Villems added: “Overall this work provides an invaluable contribution to the understanding of our evolutionary past and to the challenges that humans faced when settling down in ever-changing environments.”

Researchers say the deluge of freely available data will serve as future starting point to further studies on the genetic history of modern and ancient human populations.


Story Source:

Materials provided by University of Cambridge. The original story is licensed under a Creative Commons LicenceNote: Content may be edited for style and length.


Journal Reference:

  1. Luca Pagani, Daniel John Lawson, Evelyn Jagoda, Alexander Mörseburg, Anders Eriksson, Mario Mitt, Florian Clemente, Georgi Hudjashov, Michael DeGiorgio, Lauri Saag, Jeffrey D. Wall, Alexia Cardona, Reedik Mägi, Melissa A. Wilson Sayres, Sarah Kaewert, Charlotte Inchley, Christiana L. Scheib, Mari Järve, Monika Karmin, Guy S. Jacobs, Tiago Antao, Florin Mircea Iliescu, Alena Kushniarevich, Qasim Ayub, Chris Tyler-Smith, Yali Xue, Bayazit Yunusbayev, Kristiina Tambets, Chandana Basu Mallick, Lehti Saag, Elvira Pocheshkhova, George Andriadze, Craig Muller, Michael C. Westaway, David M. Lambert, Grigor Zoraqi, Shahlo Turdikulova, Dilbar Dalimova, Zhaxylyk Sabitov, Gazi Nurun Nahar Sultana, Joseph Lachance, Sarah Tishkoff, Kuvat Momynaliev, Jainagul Isakova, Larisa D. Damba, Marina Gubina, Pagbajabyn Nymadawa, Irina Evseeva, Lubov Atramentova, Olga Utevska, François-Xavier Ricaut, Nicolas Brucato, Herawati Sudoyo, Thierry Letellier, Murray P. Cox, Nikolay A. Barashkov, Vedrana Škaro, Lejla Mulahasanovic´, Dragan Primorac, Hovhannes Sahakyan, Maru Mormina, Christina A. Eichstaedt, Daria V. Lichman, Syafiq Abdullah, Gyaneshwer Chaubey, Joseph T. S. Wee, Evelin Mihailov, Alexandra Karunas, Sergei Litvinov, Rita Khusainova, Natalya Ekomasova, Vita Akhmetova, Irina Khidiyatova, Damir Marjanović, Levon Yepiskoposyan, Doron M. Behar, Elena Balanovska, Andres Metspalu, Miroslava Derenko, Boris Malyarchuk, Mikhail Voevoda, Sardana A. Fedorova, Ludmila P. Osipova, Marta Mirazón Lahr, Pascale Gerbault, Matthew Leavesley, Andrea Bamberg Migliano, Michael Petraglia, Oleg Balanovsky, Elza K. Khusnutdinova, Ene Metspalu, Mark G. Thomas, Andrea Manica, Rasmus Nielsen, Richard Villems, Eske Willerslev, Toomas Kivisild, Mait Metspalu. Genomic analyses inform on migration events during the peopling of EurasiaNature, 2016; DOI: 10.1038/nature19792

MLA: University of Cambridge. “Genetic ‘trace’ in Papuan genomes suggests two expansions out of Africa.” ScienceDaily. ScienceDaily, 21 September 2016. <www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2016/09/160921131119.htm>.

APA: University of Cambridge. (2016, September 21). Genetic ‘trace’ in Papuan genomes suggests two expansions out of Africa. ScienceDaily. Retrieved October 20, 2019 from www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2016/09/160921131119.htm

Indonesia’s Salim Group linked to ‘secret’ palm oil concessions in West Papua

The conglomerate appears to be concealing its involvement in the heavily forested region through offshore mechanisms.

One of Indonesia’s largest conglomerates, the Salim Group, has likely acquired four palm oil concessions in West Papua using a complex network of shared directorships and offshore companies, new research suggests.

Online watchdog awas MIFEE reported in May it had uncovered  evidence  that the four plantations — PT Rimbun Sawit Papua, PT Subur Karunia Raya, PT Bintuni Agro Prima Perkasa and PT Menara Wasior — were under the Salim Group’s control after discovering directorship and shareholding links that are not declared in the Salim Group’s stock exchange filings.

The organisation said the use of shell companies and offshore mechanisms appeared to be an attempt to distance the Salim Group from association with contentious projects and maintain a veneer of responsibility while quietly flouting its own sustainability guidelines, which include a ban on converting ecologically important High Conservation Value areas.

Deeds for the four concessionaires obtained by awas MIFEE show the firms all share addresses associated with the Salim Group, while many of their directors have previously worked for the conglomerate, which was founded by the late Liem Sioe Liong, also known as Sudono Salim, a prominent beneficiary of General Suharto’s decades-long New Order regime.

Despite the links with the Salim Group, the four companies have not been registered as subsidiaries of Indofood Agri Resources (IndoAgri), the company’s agribusiness division and a listed company on the Singapore Stock Exchange, or indeed any other publicly traded Salim Group firm, the research shows.

The Salim Group appears to have reacted to this challenge by picking and choosing which of its plantation assets [it integrates] into its publicly listed businesses, and carefully shielding the more problematic concessions behind layers of shell companies and offshore firms.

online environment watchdog awas MIFEE 

IndoAgri is the third-largest private producer of crude palm oil and while other major producers, such as Wilmar and Sinar Mas, have cancelled expansion plans in heavily forested Papua, no such pledges have been made by the Salim Group.

“The Salim Group appears to have reacted to this challenge by picking and choosing which of its plantation assets [it integrates] into its publicly listed businesses, and carefully shielding the more problematic concessions behind layers of shell companies and offshore firms,” the organisation reports.

Selwyn Moran of awas MIFEE said it was only in the last five years that Papua had become a frontier region for palm oil expansion, endangering vulnerable ecosystems, many of which had not yet been surveyed by ecologists.

“There are also serious concerns for the indigenous people of Papua. In most, if not all existing palm oil plantations, local indigenous communities living nearby have complained that the plantations have brought them no benefit,” he said, “and instead they have lost the forest they depended on for their subsistence — the sago palms which are their staple food, the animals they hunt, and other forest products which they sell.”

Despite being less exposed to international supply chains than its competitors, IndoAgri has attempted to placate critics of its practices by joining the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil and publishing regular sustainability reports, which awas MIFEE said was evidence of “greenwashing.”

But the evidence suggests the conglomerate continues to invest in plantations in the Papua region, Moran said.

Satellite images taken in February of the Rimbun Sawit Papua concession in Fakfak district show roads have been constructed in much of the southwest of the plot, while a recruitment firm has been hired to source some 1,200 migrant workers from Java. Apparent shell companies — PT Palmandiri Plantation and PT Sawit Timur Nusantara — registered to known Salim Group addresses in Jakarta bought a majority stake in the company in 2011.

“Apart from the direct habitat loss, an influx of people to the area as workers would also put stress on the surrounding forest, as more people would go hunting wildlife such as cassowaries, song birds and forest marsupials like cuscus,” said Moran.

In the Kebar Valley, about 100 kilometers west of Manokwari city, Bintuni Agro Prima Perkasa was granted a permit for 19,369 hectares in September 2014 after it was bought out in July of that year by PT Cahaya Agro Pratama, which also has a significant stake in Rimbun Sawit Papua, while several of its directors have links to other Salim Group enterprises.

North of Bintuni town, Subur Karunia Raya holds a permit to develop 38,700 hectares of what was once state forest land, where work was reportedly started late last year. A Salim Group-linked company holds almost all of the shares, the remainder being owned by its director, Rapman Hutabarat, who is also on the board of Rimbun Sawit Papua. Several other directors and commissioners hold positions at other Salim Group-linked firms.

Of the four plantations, the 28,280-hectare concession held by Menara Wasior is to date the most noteworthy for the outspoken opposition of the local Mairasi and Miere tribes of Teluk Wondama district. The memory of a bloody 2001 assault on the local communities by security forces working for two logging companies has left many traumatised and, along with ongoing confrontations with loggers, has contributed to widespread opposition to the plans. The firm, as with the others, is registered to the same address as a company that has numerous Salim Group-linked directors on its board.

Edi Suryanto, a Salim Group representative, referred questions to Muhammad Waras, sustainability manager for PT Salim Ivomas Pratama, the Salim Group’s palm oil arm. At the time of writing Waras had not responded to requests for comment.

Jago Wadley, senior forest campaigner at the London-based Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA), said the links presented in awas MIFEE’s research had highlighted the “fundamental risks” to the sustainability policies of Salim Group customers such as Wilmar and Golden Agri Resources, which have pledged to eliminate deforestation and rights abuses from their supply chains.

“Companies that violate the policies of their customers risk losing their customers. EIA urges progressive palm oil buyers to send a clear message to palm oil barons that they will no longer tolerate mass deforestation and land grabbing where such practices undermine their own corporate reputations and customer base,” he said.

Moran of awas MIFEE said the Salim Group’s apparent interests in West Papua were not uncommon.

“Across Indonesia, palm oil companies have been guilty of bulldosing community lands just as they have flattened biodiverse forests. People, biodiversity, and the global climate are often the victims. Papua is no different. Responsible buyers are seeking to distance their supply chains from such outcomes, while some of the palm oil barons that supply them seek to continue business-as-usual expansion.”

Except for Menara Wasior, the Salim Group-linked concessions have all obtained permission to develop the land from the forestry ministry, which has promised to audit existing licenses in the wake of last year’s fire and haze crisis, after which President Joko Widodo declared a moratorium on new palm oil permits.

“If the government does review permits for plantations which have not yet started planting, it must also conduct a full review of active plantations,” said Moran.

“It should recognise that the way permits have been allocated in recent years, characterized by a lack of transparency, frequent irregularities, inadequate social and environmental impact assessments and a failure to allow local indigenous communities to freely decide the future of their ancestral land, have meant that several existing plantations are subject to ongoing disputes which are continuing to seriously affect those local communities.”

This story was published with permission from Mongabay.com

Source: https://www.eco-business.com/

Does foreign aid always help the poor?

https://www.weforum.org/agenda/authors/ana-swanson, Source: https://www.weforum.org/

It sounds kind of crazy to say that foreign aid often hurts, rather than helps, poor people in poor countries. Yet that is what Angus Deaton, the newest winner of the Nobel Prize in economics, has argued.

Deaton, an economist at Princeton University who studied poverty in India and South Africa and spent decades working at the World Bank, won his prize for studying how the poor decide to save or spend money. But his ideas about foreign aid are particularly provocative. Deaton argues that, by trying to help poor people in developing countries, the rich world may actually be corrupting those nations’ governments and slowing their growth. According to Deaton, and the economists who agree with him, much of the $135 billion that the world’s most developed countries spent on official aid in 2014 may not have ended up helping the poor.

The idea of wealthier countries giving away aid blossomed in the late 1960s, as the first humanitarian crises reached mass audiences on television.  Americans watched through their TV sets as children starved to death in Biafra, an oil-rich area that had seceded from Nigeria and was now being blockaded by the Nigerian government, as Philip Gourevitch recalled in a 2010 story in the New Yorker. Protesters called on the Nixon administration for action so loudly that they ended up galvanizing the largest nonmilitary airlift the world had ever seen. Only a quarter-century after Auschwitz, humanitarian aid seemed to offer the world a new hope for fighting evil without fighting a war.

There was a strong economic and political argument for helping poor countries, too. In the mid-20th century, economists widely believed that the key to triggering growth — whether in an already well-off country or one hoping to get richer — was pumping money into a country’s factories, roads and other infrastructure. So in the hopes of spreading the Western model of democracy and market-based economies, the United States and Western European powers encouraged foreign aid to smaller and poorer countries that could fall under the influence of the Soviet Union and China.

The level of foreign aid distributed around the world soared from the 1960s, peaking at the end of the Cold War, then dipping before rising again. Live Aid music concerts raised public awareness about challenges like starvation in Africa, while the United States launched major, multibillion-dollar aid initiatives. And the World Bank and advocates of aid aggressively seized on research that claimed that foreign aid led to economic development.

Deaton wasn’t the first economist to challenge these assumptions, but over the past two decades his arguments began to receive a great deal of attention. And he made them with perhaps a better understanding of the data than anyone had before. Deaton’s skepticism about the benefits of foreign aid grew out of his research, which involved looking in detail at households in the developing world, where he could see the effects of foreign aid intervention.

“I think his understanding of how the world worked at the micro level made him extremely suspicious of these get-rich-quick schemes that some people peddled at the development level,” says Daron Acemoglu, an economist at MIT.

The data suggested that the claims of the aid community were sometimes not borne out. Even as the level of foreign aid into Africa soared through the 1980s and 1990s, African economies were doing worse than ever, as the chart below, from a paper by economist Bill Easterly of New York University, shows.

151023-foreign aid Africa Angus Deaton Wonk Blog

William Easterly, “Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?”

The effect wasn’t limited to Africa. Many economists were noticing that an influx of foreign aid did not seem to produce economic growth in countries around the world. Rather, lots of foreign aid flowing into a country tended to be correlated with lower economic growth, as this chart from a paper byArvind Subramanian and Raghuram Rajan shows.

The countries that receive less aid, those on the left-hand side of the chart, tend to have higher growth — while those that receive more aid, on the right-hand side, have lower growth.

Why was this happening? The answer wasn’t immediately clear, but Deaton and other economists argued that it had to do with how foreign money changed the relationship between a government and its people.

Think of it this way: In order to have the funding to run a country, a government needs to collect taxes from its people. Since the people ultimately hold the purse strings, they have a certain amount of control over their government. If leaders don’t deliver the basic services they promise, the people have the power to cut them off.

Deaton argued that foreign aid can weaken this relationship, leaving a government less accountable to its people, the congress or parliament, and the courts.

“My critique of aid has been more to do with countries where they get an enormous amount of aid relative to everything else that goes on in that country,” Deaton said in an interview with Wonkblog. “For instance, most governments depend on their people for taxes in order to run themselves and provide services to their people. Governments that get all their money from aid don’t have that at all, and I think of that as very corrosive.”

It might seem odd that having more money would not help a poor country. Yet economists have long observed that countries that have an abundance of wealth from natural resources, like oil or diamonds, tend to be more unequal, less developed and more impoverished, as the chart below shows. Countries at the left-hand side of the chart have fewer fuels, ores and metals and higher growth, while those at the right-hand side have more natural resource wealth, yet slower growth. Economists postulate that this “natural resource curse” happens for a variety of reasons, but one is that such wealth can strengthen and corrupt a government.

curse

Like revenue from oil or diamonds, wealth from foreign aid can be a corrupting influence on weak governments, “turning what should be beneficial political institutions into toxic ones,” Deaton writes in his book “The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality.” This wealth can make governments more despotic, and it can also increase the risk of civil war, since there is less power sharing, as well as a lucrative prize worth fighting for.

Deaton and his supporters offer dozens of examples of humanitarian aid being used to support despotic regimes and compounding misery, including in Zaire, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Somalia, Biafra, and the Khmer Rouge on the border of Cambodia and Thailand. Citing Africa researcher Alex de Waal, Deaton writes that “aid can only reach the victims of war by paying off the warlords, and sometimes extending the war.”

He also gives plenty of examples in which the United States gives aid “for ‘us,’ not for ‘them’” – to support our strategic allies, our commercial interests or our moral or political beliefs, rather than the interests of the local people.

The United States gave aid to Ethiopia for decades under then-President Meles Zenawi Asres, because he opposed Islamic fundamentalism and Ethiopia was so poor. Never mind that Asres was “one of the most repressive and autocratic dictators in Africa,” Deaton writes. According to Deaton, “the award for sheer creativity” goes to Maaouya Ould Sid’Ahmed Taya, president of Mauritania from 1984 to 2005. Western countries stopped giving aid to Taya after his government became too politically repressive, but he managed to get the taps turned on again by becoming one of the few Arab nations to recognize Israel.

Some might argue for bypassing corrupt governments altogether and distributing food or funding directly among the people. Deaton acknowledges that, in some cases, this might be worth it to save lives. But one problem with this approach is that it’s difficult: To get to the powerless, you often have to go through the powerful. Another issue, is that it undermines what people in developing countries need most — “an effective government that works with them for today and tomorrow,” he writes.

The old calculus of foreign aid was that poor countries were merely suffering from a lack of money. But these days, many economists question this assumption, arguing that development has more to do with the strength of a country’s institutions – political and social systems that are developed through the interplay of a government and its people.

There are lot of places around the world that lack good roads, clean water and good hospitals, says MIT’s Acemoglu: “Why do these places exist? If you look at it, you quickly disabuse yourself of the notion that they exist because it’s impossible for the state to provide services there.” What these countries need even more than money is effective governance, something that foreign aid can undermine, the thinking goes.

Some people believe that Deaton’s critique of foreign aid goes too far. There are better and worse ways to distribute foreign aid, they say. Some project-based approaches — such as financing a local business, building a well, or providing uniforms so that girls can go to school — have been very successful in helping local communities. In the last decade, researchers have tried to integrate these lessons from economists and argue for more effective aid practices.

Many people believe that the aid community needs more scrutiny to determine which practices have been effective and which have not. Economists such as Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo, for example, argue for creating randomized control trials that allow researchers to carefully examine the development effects of different types of projects — for example, following microcredit as it is extended to people in poor countries.

These methods have again led to a swell in optimism in professional circles about foreign aid efforts. And again, Deaton is playing the skeptic.

While Deaton agrees that many development projects are successful, he’scritical of claims that these projects can be replicated elsewhere or on a larger scale. “The trouble is that ‘what works’ is a highly contingent concept,” he said in an interview. “If it works in the highlands of Kenya, there’s no reason to believe it will work in India, or that it will work in Princeton, New Jersey.”

The success of a local project, like microfinancing, also depends on numerous other local factors, which are harder for researchers to isolate. Saying that these randomized control trials prove that certain projects cause growth or development is like saying that flour causes cake, Deaton writes in his book. “Flour ‘causes’ cakes, in the sense that cakes made without flour do worse than cakes made with flour – and we can do any number of experiments to demonstrate it – but flour will not work without a rising agent, eggs, and butter – the helping factors that are needed for the flour to ‘cause’ the cake.”

Deaton’s critiques of foreign aid stem from his natural skepticism of how people use — and abuse — economic data to advance their arguments. The science of measuring economic effects is much more important, much harder and more controversial than we usually think, he told The Post.

Acemoglu said of Deaton: “He’s challenging, and he’s sharp, and he’s extremely critical of things he thinks are shoddy and things that are over-claiming. And I think the foreign aid area, that policy arena, really riled him up because it was so lacking in rigor but also so grandiose in its claims.”

Deaton doesn’t argue against all types of foreign aid. In particular, he believes that certain types of health aid – offering vaccinations, or developing cheap and effective drugs to treat malaria, for example — have been hugely beneficial to developing countries.

But mostly, he said, the rich world needs to think about “what can we do that would make lives better for millions of poor people around the world without getting into their economies in the way that we’re doing by giving huge sums of money to their governments.” Overall, he argues that we should focus on doing less harm in the developing world, like selling fewer weapons to despots, or ensuring that developing countries get a fair deal in trade agreements, and aren’t harmed by U.S. foreign policy decisions.

Deaton also believes that our attitude toward foreign aid – that developed countries ought to swoop in and save everyone else – is condescending and suspiciously similar to the ideas of colonialism.  The rhetoric of colonialism, too, “was all about helping people, albeit about bringing civilization and enlightenment to people whose humanity was far from fully recognized,” he has written.

Instead, many of the positive things that are happening in Africa – the huge adoption in cell phones over the past decade, for example – are totally homegrown. He points out that, while the world has made huge strides in reducing poverty in recent decades, almost none of this has been due to aid. Most has been due to development in countries like China, which have received very little aid as a proportion of gross domestic product and have “had to work it out for themselves.”

Ultimately, Deaton argues that we should stand aside and let poorer countries develop in their own ways. “Who put us in charge?” he asks.

This article is published in collaboration with Washington Post. Publication does not imply endorsement of views by the World Economic Forum.

To keep up with the Agenda subscribe to our weekly newsletter.

Author: Ana Swanson is a reporter for Wonkblog specializing in business, economics, data visualization and China.

Image: People carry food aid distributed. REUTERS/Antonio. 

China’s Aid to Africa: Monster or Messiah?

Source: https://www.brookings.edu/ 

In recent years, China’s economic presence in Africa has led to a heated debate, some of it well-informed and some of it not, about the nature of Chinese involvement and its implications for the continent.  The debate is partially motivated by the rapid growth of China’s economic presence in Africa: for example, Chinese investment in Africa grew from USD 210 million in 2000 to 3.17 billion in 2011.[1] Aid is an important policy instrument for China among its various engagements with Africa, and indeed Africa has been a top recipient of Chinese aid:  by the end of 2009 it had received 45.7 percent of the RMB 256.29 billion cumulative foreign aid of China.[2] This aid to Africa has raised many questions, such as its composition, its goal and nature.

What constitutes China’s aid?

Officially, China provides eight types of foreign aid: complete projects, goods and materials, technical cooperation, human resource development cooperation, medical assistance, emergency humanitarian aid, volunteer programs, and debt relief. [3] China’s aid to Africa covers a wide array of fields, such as agriculture, education, transportation, energy, communications, and health. According to Chinese scholars, since 1956, China has provided almost 900 aid projects to African countries, including assistance supporting textile factories, hydropower stations, stadiums, hospitals, and schools.

Official development assistance is defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as concessional funding given to developing countries and to multilateral institutions primarily for the purpose of promoting welfare and economic development in the recipient country. [4] China is not a member of OECD and does not follow its definition or practice on development aid. The bulk of Chinese financing in Africa falls under the category of development finance, but not aid. This fact is privately acknowledged by Chinese government analysts, although Chinese literature constantly blurs the distinction between the two categories.

The billions of dollars that China commits to Africa are repayable, long-term loans. From 2009 to 2012, China provided USD 10 billion in financing to Africa in the form of “concessional loans.”[5] During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first overseas trip to Africa in March 2013, he doubled this commitment to USD 20 billion from 2013 to 2015.[6] The head sovereign risk analyst of Export-Import Bank of China announced in November 2013 that by 2025, China will have provided Africa with USD 1 trillion in financing, including direct investment, soft loans and commercial loans. [7]

China’s own policy actively contributes to the confusion between development finance and aid. The Chinese government encourages its agencies and commercial entities to “closely mix and combine foreign aid, direct investment, service contracts, labor cooperation, foreign trade and export.”[8] The goal is to maximize feasibility and flexibility of Chinese projects to meet local realities in the recipient country, but it also makes it difficult to capture which portion of the financing is – or should be – categorized as aid. One rather convincing theory is that the Chinese government in effect pays for the difference between the interest rates of concessional loans provided to Africa and comparable commercial loans. Therefore, only the small difference in interest rates could qualify as Chinese aid.

Who does China’s aid serve?

Despite Chinese leaders’ claim that China’s assistance to Africa is totally selfless and altruistic, the reality is far more complex.[9] China’s policy toward Africa is pragmatic, and aid has been a useful policy instrument since the early days of People’s Republic of China.

During the Cold War, foreign aid an important political tool that China used to gain Africa’s diplomatic recognition and to compete with the United States and the Soviet Union for Africa’s support. Between 1963 and 1964, Zhou Enlai visited 10 African countries and announced the well-known “Eight Principles of Foreign Economic and Technological Assistance.”[10] These aid principles were designed to compete simultaneously with the “imperialists” (the United States) and the “revisionists” (the Soviet Union) for Africa’s approval and support.

These efforts were enhanced during the Cultural Revolution under the influence of a radical revolutionary ideology, motivating China to provide large amounts of foreign aid to Africa despite its own domestic economic difficulties. [11] One famous example was the Tanzania-Zambia Railway built between 1970 and 1975, for which China provided a zero-interest loan of RMB 980 million. By the mid-1980s, China’s generous assistance had opened the door to diplomatic recognition with 44 African countries. [12]

Since the beginning of China’s reform and opening up, especially after 2000, Africa has become an increasingly important economic partner for China. Africa enjoys rich natural resources and market potential, and urgently needs infrastructure and development finance to stimulate economic growth. Chinese development finance, combined with the aid, aims at not only benefiting the local recipient countries, but also China itself. For example, China’s “tied aid” for infrastructure usually favors Chinese companies (especially state-owned enterprises), while its loans are in many cases backed by African natural resources.

Much Chinese financing to Africa is associated with securing the continent’s natural resources. Using what is sometimes characterized as the “Angola Model,” Chinas frequently provides low-interest loans to nations who rely on commodities, such as oil or mineral resources, as collateral.[13] In these cases, the recipient nations usually suffer from low credit ratings and have great difficulty obtaining funding from the international financial market; China makes financing relatively available—with certain conditions.

Though commodity-backed loans were not created by China – leading Western banks were making such loans to African countries, including Angola and Ghana, before China Eximbank and Angola completed their first oil-backed loan in March 2004 – but the Chinese built the model to scale and applied it using a systematic approach. In Angola in 2006, USD 4 billion in such loans probably helped Chinese oil companies win the exploitation rights to multiple oil blocks.[14] In 2010, Sinopec’s acquisition of a 50 percent stake in Block 18 coincided with the disbursement of the first tranche of Eximbank funding, and in 2005, Sinopec’s acquisition of rights to Block 3/80 coincided with the announcement of a new USD 2 billion loan from China Eximbank to the Angolan government.[15]  In 2008, the China Railway Group used the same model to secure the mining rights to the Democratic Republic of Congo’s copper and cobalt mines under the slogan “(Infrastructure) projects for resources.”[16] According to Debra Brautigam, a top expert on China-Africa relations, between 2004 and 2011, China reached similar unprecedented deals with at least seven resource-rich African countries, with a total volume of nearly USD 14 billion.[17]

In addition to securing Africa’s natural resources, China’s capital flows into Africa also create business opportunities for Chinese service contractors, such as construction companies. According to Chinese analysts, Africa is China’s second-largest supplier of service contracts, and “when we provide Africa assistance of RMB 1 billion, we will get service contracts worth USD 1 billion (RMB 6 billion) from Africa.”[18] In exchange for most Chinese financial aid to Africa, Beijing requires that infrastructure construction and other contracts favor Chinese service providers: 70 percent of them go to “approved,” mostly state-owned, Chinese companies, and the rest are open to local firms, many of which are also joint ventures with Chinese groups.[19] In this sense, China’s financing to Africa, including aid, creates business for Chinese companies and employment opportunities for Chinese laborers, a critical goal of Beijing’s Going Out strategy.

How to understand Chinese aid to Africa?

With a few exceptions, there is a strong tendency among observers to assert moral judgments in the assessment of Chinese aid and development finance to Africa: China’s activities are either “evil” because they represent China’s selfish quest for natural resources and damage Africa’s fragile efforts to improve governance and build a sustainable future; or they are “virtuous” because they contribute to a foundation for long-term economic development, through infrastructure projects and revenue creation.

This polarization reveals the two sides of the same coin. On the positive side, China’s aid and development financing fills a void left by the West and promotes the development of African countries. Many Chinese projects require large investment and long pay-back terms that traditional donors are reluctant to provide.  On the other hand, however, these short-term benefits should not form a cover-up for the potential long-term negative consequences associated with neglecting issues of governance, fairness and sustainability. For example, when the “tied aid” is linked to the profitability of Chinese companies, it becomes questionable whether China would prioritize Africa’s interests or its own.

There is also an ongoing debate inside China about the goal and management of Chinese aid to Africa. For the foreign policy bureaucrats at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, foreign aid is essentially a political instrument for China to strengthen bilateral ties and facilitate the development of African countries. In their view, political considerations should be the most important criteria in aid decision-making. Economic benefits associated with aid projects, such as profitability, resource extraction, or the acquisition service contracts for Chinese vendors, should only be secondary.

However, trade promoters such as the Ministry of Commerce have rather opposite perspective. In their view, foreign aid serves China’s overall national priority, which by definition is economic growth. Therefore, all aspects of aid decisions should reflect broad economic considerations. Under this logic, the inclination is to allocate the aid budget to countries that offer China the greatest number of commercial opportunities and benefits. Since China’s top economic interest is Africa’s natural resources, aid decisions are inevitably skewed toward resource-rich countries while others receive less favorable consideration.[20]

This practice is problematic in that many of the resource-rich African countries with which China works also suffer from serious political problems, such as authoritarianism, poor governance, and corruption. When the Ministry of Commerce pursues economic gains and associates aid projects with resource extraction, it uses aid packages to promote business relations. This directly contributes to the negative perception that China is pouring aid, funding, and infrastructure projects to prop up corrupt governments in exchange for natural resources. As many Chinese analysts observe, the Foreign Ministry in recent years has been fighting fiercely for the authority to manage China’s foreign aid projects, which are currently under the purview of the Ministry of Commerce.

The intention of China’s aid to Africa is benign but not altruistic. China does not seek to use aid to influence the domestic politics of African countries or dictate policies. Instead, it truly hopes to help Africa achieve better development while avoiding meddling with the internal affairs of African countries through conditional aid. But on the other hand, China is not helping Africa in exchange for nothing. Chinese projects create access to Africa’s natural resources and local markets, business opportunities for Chinese companies and employment for Chinese labors. When Chinese officials emphasize that China also provides aid to countries that are not rich in natural resources to defuse international criticisms, they often forget to mention that China may have its eyes on other things which these countries can deliver, such as their support of Beijing’s “one China” policy, of China’s agenda at multilateral forums, and of China as a “responsible stakeholder.”  In this sense, China’s comprehensive, multi-dimensional agenda of its aid to Africa defies any simplistic categorization.


[1] “Report on Development of China’s Outward Investment and Economic Cooperation, 2011-2012,” [中国对外投资合作发展报告], Ministry of Commerce, December 2012.

[2] He Wenping, “China to Africa: Gives It Fish and Teaches It Fishing,” [中国对非洲:授其以鱼,更授其以渔], JinRongBaoLan, May 6, 2013, http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/bank/bank_hydt/20130506/200915363934.shtml.

[3] “China’s Foreign Aid,” Xinhua News Agency, April 21, 2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-04/21/c_13839683_6.htm.

[4] “Official Development Assistance: Definition and Coverage,” OECD, http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm.

[5] “China To Complete 10 Billion USD Concessional Loans to Africa before the End of Year,” [中国将在年底前完成对非洲100亿美元优惠贷款计划], China Radio International, July 20, 2012. http://gb.cri.cn/27824/2012/07/20/3365s3778295.htm

[6] “China to Provide 20 billion USD Loan Credits to Africa in Three Years,” [中国三年内将向非洲提供200亿美元贷款额度], Cai Xin, March 25, 2013, http://international.caixin.com/2013-03-25/100506116.html.

[7] Toh Han Shih, “China to Provide Africa with US$1 trillion financing,” November 18, 2013, South China Morning Posthttp://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/1358902/china-provide-africa-us1tr-financing.

[8] Piao Yingji, “The Evolution and Future Trend of China’s Direct Investment in Africa,” 《中国对非洲直接投资的发展历程与未来趋势》, [Hai Wai Tou Zi Yu Chu Kou Xin Dai], 2006 Volume 5.  www.eximbank.gov.cn/topic/hwtz/2006/1_19.doc.

[9] “Wen Jiabao: China Did Not Exploit One Single Drop of Oil or One Single Ton of Minerals from Africa,” China.com.cn, September 15, 2011, http://www.china.com.cn/economic/txt/2011-09/15/content_23419056.htm.

[10] The principles include: China always bases itself on the principle of equality and mutual benefit in providing aid to other nations; China never attaches any conditions or asks for any privileges; China helps lighten the burden of recipient countries as much as possible; China aims at helping recipient countries to gradually achieve self-reliance and independent development; China strives to develop aid projects that require less investment but yield quicker results; China provides the best-quality equipment and materials of its own manufacture; in providing technical assistance, China shall see to it that the personnel of the recipient country fully master such techniques; the Chinese experts are not allowed to make any special demands or enjoy any special amenities. “Zhou Enlai Announced Eight Principles of Foreign Aid,” China Daily, August 13, 2010.

[11] “African Expert Interprets the 55 Years of Sino-African Relations,” 《非洲专家解读中非关系55年》, China Talk, Feb 23, 2011, fangtan.china.com.cn/2011-02/21/content_21965753.htm.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Yi Yimin, “China Probes Its Africa Model,” China Dialogue, August 18, 2011, http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/4470-China-probes-its-Africa-model-1-.

[14] Zhang Changbing, “Opportunities and Challenges in Exploring and Developing African Oil Resources,” [勘探开发非洲石油资源的机遇与挑战], Guo Ji Jing Ji He Zuo, 2008, Volume 3, http://waas.cass.cn/upload/2011/06/d20110619154331656.pdf.

[15] Lucy Corkin, “China and Angola: Strategic Partnership or Marriage of Convenience?”, The Angola Brief, January 2011, Volume 1, No.1 http://www.cmi.no/publications/publication/?3938=china-and-angola-strategic-partnership-or-marriage.

[16] “Projects for Resources, China Railway Heads for DRC to Develop Cobalt Mines,” [以项目换资源 中国中铁赴刚果(金)开发铜钴矿], Zhong Guo Zheng Quan Bao, April 23, 2008, http://ccnews.people.com.cn/GB/7153049.html.

[17] Debra Brautigam, “China: Africa’s Oriental Hope,” [中国:非洲的东方希望], Hai Wai Wen Zhai, August 25, 2011, http://www.observe-china.com/article/51.

[18] Yang Fei, “People Should Rationally Understand the USD 20 Billion Assistance Loans to Africa,” [对“200亿美元援非贷款”应理性看待], China Radio International, March 29, 2013, http://gb.cri.cn/27824/2013/03/29/2165s4069180.htm.

[19] Jamil, Anderlini, “China Insists on ‘Tied Aid’ to Africa,” Financial Times, June 25, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/908c24f2-2343-11dc-9e7e-000b5df10621.html#axzz2RtN8dPxR.

[20] Interview with a Chinese analyst, Beijing, March 2013.

James Lovelock: ‘enjoy life while you can: in 20 years global warming will hit the fan’

The climate science maverick believes catastrophe is inevitable, carbon offsetting is a joke and ethical living a scam. So what would he do? By Decca Aitkenhead

James Lovelock
James Lovelock. Photograph: Eamonn McCabe

In 1965 executives at Shell wanted to know what the world would look like in the year 2000. They consulted a range of experts, who speculated about fusion-powered hovercrafts and “all sorts of fanciful technological stuff”. When the oil company asked the scientist James Lovelock, he predicted that the main problem in 2000 would be the environment. “It will be worsening then to such an extent that it will seriously affect their business,” he said.

“And of course,” Lovelock says, with a smile 43 years later, “that’s almost exactly what’s happened.”

Lovelock has been dispensing predictions from his one-man laboratory in an old mill in Cornwall since the mid-1960s, the consistent accuracy of which have earned him a reputation as one of Britain’s most respected – if maverick – independent scientists. Working alone since the age of 40, he invented a device that detected CFCs, which helped detect the growing hole in the ozone layer, and introduced the Gaia hypothesis, a revolutionary theory that the Earth is a self-regulating super-organism. Initially ridiculed by many scientists as new age nonsense, today that theory forms the basis of almost all climate science.

For decades, his advocacy of nuclear power appalled fellow environmentalists – but recently increasing numbers of them have come around to his way of thinking. His latest book, The Revenge of Gaia, predicts that by 2020 extreme weather will be the norm, causing global devastation; that by 2040 much of Europe will be Saharan; and parts of London will be underwater. The most recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report deploys less dramatic language – but its calculations aren’t a million miles away from his.

As with most people, my panic about climate change is equalled only by my confusion over what I ought to do about it. A meeting with Lovelock therefore feels a little like an audience with a prophet. Buried down a winding track through wild woodland, in an office full of books and papers and contraptions involving dials and wires, the 88-year-old presents his thoughts with a quiet, unshakable conviction that can be unnerving. More alarming even than his apocalyptic climate predictions is his utter certainty that almost everything we’re trying to do about it is wrong.

On the day we meet, the Daily Mail has launched a campaign to rid Britain of plastic shopping bags. The initiative sits comfortably within the current canon of eco ideas, next to ethical consumption, carbon offsetting, recycling and so on – all of which are premised on the calculation that individual lifestyle adjustments can still save the planet. This is, Lovelock says, a deluded fantasy. Most of the things we have been told to do might make us feel better, but they won’t make any difference. Global warming has passed the tipping point, and catastrophe is unstoppable.

“It’s just too late for it,” he says. “Perhaps if we’d gone along routes like that in 1967, it might have helped. But we don’t have time. All these standard green things, like sustainable development, I think these are just words that mean nothing. I get an awful lot of people coming to me saying you can’t say that, because it gives us nothing to do. I say on the contrary, it gives us an immense amount to do. Just not the kinds of things you want to do.”

He dismisses eco ideas briskly, one by one. “Carbon offsetting? I wouldn’t dream of it. It’s just a joke. To pay money to plant trees, to think you’re offsetting the carbon? You’re probably making matters worse. You’re far better off giving to the charity Cool Earth, which gives the money to the native peoples to not take down their forests.”

Do he and his wife try to limit the number of flights they take? “No we don’t. Because we can’t.” And recycling, he adds, is “almost certainly a waste of time and energy”, while having a “green lifestyle” amounts to little more than “ostentatious grand gestures”. He distrusts the notion of ethical consumption. “Because always, in the end, it turns out to be a scam … or if it wasn’t one in the beginning, it becomes one.”

Somewhat unexpectedly, Lovelock concedes that the Mail’s plastic bag campaign seems, “on the face of it, a good thing”. But it transpires that this is largely a tactical response; he regards it as merely more rearrangement of Titanic deckchairs, “but I’ve learnt there’s no point in causing a quarrel over everything”. He saves his thunder for what he considers the emptiest false promise of all – renewable energy.

“You’re never going to get enough energy from wind to run a society such as ours,” he says. “Windmills! Oh no. No way of doing it. You can cover the whole country with the blasted things, millions of them. Waste of time.”

This is all delivered with an air of benign wonder at the intractable stupidity of people. “I see it with everybody. People just want to go on doing what they’re doing. They want business as usual. They say, ‘Oh yes, there’s going to be a problem up ahead,’ but they don’t want to change anything.”

Lovelock believes global warming is now irreversible, and that nothing can prevent large parts of the planet becoming too hot to inhabit, or sinking underwater, resulting in mass migration, famine and epidemics. Britain is going to become a lifeboat for refugees from mainland Europe, so instead of wasting our time on wind turbines we need to start planning how to survive. To Lovelock, the logic is clear. The sustainability brigade are insane to think we can save ourselves by going back to nature; our only chance of survival will come not from less technology, but more.

Nuclear power, he argues, can solve our energy problem – the bigger challenge will be food. “Maybe they’ll synthesise food. I don’t know. Synthesising food is not some mad visionary idea; you can buy it in Tesco’s, in the form of Quorn. It’s not that good, but people buy it. You can live on it.” But he fears we won’t invent the necessary technologies in time, and expects “about 80%” of the world’s population to be wiped out by 2100. Prophets have been foretelling Armageddon since time began, he says. “But this is the real thing.”

Faced with two versions of the future – Kyoto’s preventative action and Lovelock’s apocalypse – who are we to believe? Some critics have suggested Lovelock’s readiness to concede the fight against climate change owes more to old age than science: “People who say that about me haven’t reached my age,” he says laughing.

But when I ask if he attributes the conflicting predictions to differences in scientific understanding or personality, he says: “Personality.”

There’s more than a hint of the controversialist in his work, and it seems an unlikely coincidence that Lovelock became convinced of the irreversibility of climate change in 2004, at the very point when the international consensus was coming round to the need for urgent action. Aren’t his theories at least partly driven by a fondness for heresy?

“Not a bit! Not a bit! All I want is a quiet life! But I can’t help noticing when things happen, when you go out and find something. People don’t like it because it upsets their ideas.”

But the suspicion seems confirmed when I ask if he’s found it rewarding to see many of his climate change warnings endorsed by the IPCC. “Oh no! In fact, I’m writing another book now, I’m about a third of the way into it, to try and take the next steps ahead.”

Interviewers often remark upon the discrepancy between Lovelock’s predictions of doom, and his good humour. “Well I’m cheerful!” he says, smiling. “I’m an optimist. It’s going to happen.”

Humanity is in a period exactly like 1938-9, he explains, when “we all knew something terrible was going to happen, but didn’t know what to do about it”. But once the second world war was under way, “everyone got excited, they loved the things they could do, it was one long holiday … so when I think of the impending crisis now, I think in those terms. A sense of purpose – that’s what people want.”

At moments I wonder about Lovelock’s credentials as a prophet. Sometimes he seems less clear-eyed with scientific vision than disposed to see the version of the future his prejudices are looking for. A socialist as a young man, he now favours market forces, and it’s not clear whether his politics are the child or the father of his science. His hostility to renewable energy, for example, gets expressed in strikingly Eurosceptic terms of irritation with subsidies and bureaucrats. But then, when he talks about the Earth – or Gaia – it is in the purest scientific terms all.

“There have been seven disasters since humans came on the earth, very similar to the one that’s just about to happen. I think these events keep separating the wheat from the chaff. And eventually we’ll have a human on the planet that really does understand it and can live with it properly. That’s the source of my optimism.”

What would Lovelock do now, I ask, if he were me? He smiles and says: “Enjoy life while you can. Because if you’re lucky it’s going to be 20 years before it hits the fan.”